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:r.rr  President, 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen, 
The  traditions of this House  require the President of the  Commission 
to present  the  Co~~ssion's outline programme  in February each year. 
lmd  so,  although I  spoke  to  investiture debate  as recently as 
January of last year,  I  stand before you today.  But  I  am  not 
merely bowing to tradition, for times are  so hard that  my  address 
and  the debate which will follow  cannot be regarded,  this year of 
all years,  as  just another ritual. 
A fortnight  ago  the  Conn:nission  adopted its outl:i.ne  prog:..~amnJ.e..  The 
document  now  in your hands  sets out  the main lines of action which 
the Commission will be  pursuing Oirer  the  mor1ths  ahead.,  It 1rwuld 
be  tedious and  a  ~vaste of time for  me  to  go  over the  same  grounde 
Instead,  I  '~<·oul.rl  like to offer you  roy  analysis of the political ard 
eccnom.ic  context  and  go  on from this to indicate the  maj o::·  a  ...  11d 
pr:i.orities \Jirhich,  to  my  mind,  the  most  effective response  tc 
the  challer~es of the day. 
S'-e  Commu.nity  is :in danger.,  H:\.thin its frontiers  cohes:icn  i~l 
cor..1promised  by the  eco:::Jomic  c.rj.sis  ~rhich is rousing the  d.euJons 
of protectionism,  the  illu;C'.ion that salvation lies in goi.ng it 
alone.  Outside, the  Comrrn.:tni ty is having to  conter..d.  with the 
aggressive  beha;viour of its trading partners  just t·lhen it should 
be working,for the  survival of its traditional industries and 
promoting the rise of those which hold  the key to industrial 
development in the futureo 2 THE  CONTEXT 
The  economic  situation within the Community is still disturbing. 
In fact it vJOrsened  in some  respects during 1981.  I  am  thirJdng 
above  all.  of unemployment,  1.vhich  has  reached proportions 
:mprecedented since the  end of the  'frTar~  At  the  end of last year:· 
r..o  less than 10 260  000  people  '1'-Tere  looking f'or  v-wrk~  That's 
9· 2%  of' the active  population and an increase of 28%  in one year! 
The  prospects for  g!'Oi.vth  of'f'ered  l>y  present  economic policies 
point toward.s  a  stead.y rise in unemployrnen:l;,  ~ie  are liable to 
see  a  re-run of the last  f<:>w  years  when it seemed.  as if' we  had 
more  or less consigned ne1·.rcomers  on the labour market to the 
dole  queue.  A  decade  ago today's unemployment  figures  woulrl 
have  been regarded as beyond  the limits of the socially acceptable. 
He  underestimated the limits,  but this does  not mean that  t>J"e  can 
push them  back with  impunity~ If we  fail to act  now,  we  may  be 
faced with serious  problems  of social stability one  day. - 4-
Quite apart  from the hardship it brings,  unemployment  is an 
enormous  v.ras·[;e  of resources..  The  economic  oo9t is broadly 
comparable  to the  oil bill, to which we  attach so  much  importanoe. 
The  social cost  is i'ncalculable  .. 
For a  number of years 1  our  investment  record has been poor to put 
it mildly..  The  proportion of resources devoted to  irJvestment  is 
down  by  several points,  in contrast to the  showing of our main 
trading partners  7  the  United States and Japa.11., 
1--Jhat  rrakes this so  disheartening is that  we  need a  higher,  not  a 
lower~ rate  :e>:f  investment  to finan.ce  indus"'~rial restruo"'GuringQ. 
And  a  neN  energy strategy  .. 
The  lack of  investment  is <rrorrying in more  ways  ·t;han  one..  To 
begin with,  we  are not  creating the  jobs needed to provide 
employment  for  a..."1.  active population that is still gro·Hing quite 
rapidly.,  Secondly,  we  are  slow-zing the  pace  of technological 
ilmovation which  investment  brings.,  Thirdly,  1rre  are  impairing 
oux  competitiveness,  which will increasingly depend on  our ability 
to produce at competitive prices and  move  into technologically-
advanced products., 
The  unrelenting recession is strengthening the temptation to  go 
it alone I»Jhich ·will eventually lead to fragmentation of the 
internal market..  The  proliferation of national aids is sapping 
o1rr  best efforts to promote  integration.  The  Community is 
lurching from wine  war to turkey fight to budget  dispute  .. 
Restructuring of the steel industry is being slov<ed  dovm  because 
' 
no  one 1vill ·willingly accept  redu.."'ldancies  in regions already hard. 
hit by the crisis.  There are  rrany  more  examples.  It is essential 
that we  deal with the threat to the  single market. - 5/6-
The single market is a  priceless,  irreplaceable  asset;  it has  been 
a  source of grm,rth,  employment,  produc-tivity and  geneJ."'al  well  being 
since the Comt1unity  saw the light of day.  The  short~erm advantage~ 
of inc:r-eased protection 
1are negligible compared with the cost -
a&nittedly more difficult to  quanti~~- of a  renationalization of markets. 
The  Community  could not  survive the destruction of the  ~ingle market. 
If it vrere to founder,  the Commu:ni ty 's policies - the common  commercial 
policy for instance- would  lose their raiso~sd'et~.  Even the common 
agricultural ·policy,  founded  on the twin pillars of free internal trade 
anrJ  CoP...mu.."li ty preference,  would not last  long9  Recent  events illustra.t  e 
this all too clearly. 
Ov.1·  relations t'lith the United Sta:ces  and Japan are getting more and 
wo::"e  strained  2~S  the crisis bites clt;eper.  .A  major dispute is building 
1:i:'  with the .A;:::1ericans  over steel and  ag:r:i.cultu.re  a..-.d  rJi  th the .Japanese 
ove:r  the tre.de balanct:'h  As  markets contract  competition 'becomes  fiercer 
a~d. tends to spill over into o-t;her  areas.  Ultimately the very basis for 
the mutu.El.l  guarantees ivhich  ensure effective freedom  oi:'  trade and 
co:jpeti  tion is put in  ~ieo:pard;y. 
I  mi;;ht  be  le;::;s  concerned about the trade problem if our differences of 
opinion with the United States did not  extend to such major  issues  as 
l~orth-South relations, if the il'rt;ernatio:nal situation >-<ere  not  so unstable  .. 
Every dc:,y  11e  see how difficult the world's democracies are finding it to 
maintain a  modicum  of political cohesion.  Do  we  really want  to go to war 
over  economic  questions which,  important  though they mey  be,  pale into 
insignificance beside the political challenges  facing us?  This was  my 
n1essage to the American representatives  I  met  in Brussels last December, 
\ 
and  I  think it hit home. 7 
THE  !~AY  MANDATE 
The  Commission's May  :Mandate  Report  dominated Community  business in 1981 
and  will  continue to do  so in 1982. 
Events  have  clearly shovm  that the  Commission  was  quite right to insist 
from  the outset that the mandate  could not be interpreted solely in 
budgetary termse  Its view tva.s  that  a  solution to the Community's 
problems  could only be  found  by malcing  an  immediate start on  laying the 
foundations  for a  second-generation. Europe~ 
You  i'lill recall that the  Commission  recommended  a  three-point  programme 
to give fresh impetus  to  the  Comlln,mi ty and  restore its cohesion., 
Point  1  was  to  revive the  process of Europe~~ integration by restoring 
economic  and monetcu•y  solidarity and  developing the  Conum:t."li ty policies 
which  w~ll provide the  answers  to the  challenges of the  eightiesw 
especially energy,  innovation and research  a.nd  development  policies, 
~·1hioh are Yi tal for better employment  prospects a.nd  for the  rene~val of 
our industries  .. 
Point  2  ~~as to  reform and  adapt  the aspects of the  common  agrioul  tu.ral 
policy which  are not  entirely satisfactory, but without  thro~~ng out its 
basic principles. 
Point  3  was  to resolve the budget  problem temporarily by whatever measures 
are necessar,Y until such time as the development  of common  policies 
furnishes more  lasting solutions. - 8-
The  ne:ed  to give the  Community  fresh impetus was  evident  when  we  wrote 
our  re:port  last June:  subsequent  e\~ents have borne this out.  I  have 
just outlined the difficulties confronting us..  They  will not  be  solved 
by larger doses  of nationalism.  The  message  from  Parliament  and the 
Commission is the  same:  the  remedy  has to be greater solidarity and 
further integration.  This was  and still is fundamental  to the position 
1o1hich  coloured the  Commission's  report  and subsequent proposals, 
At  the  sa.'Tle  time  as  producing our design for the future  we  were  looking 
for solutions to two  probleq~s "Jhi.ch  are  causing growing concern:  adjustment 
of the  common  agricultural policy and the United Kingdom's  budget  problem. 
The  Commission's position on the  common  agricultural policy is 
und.erpi:n.'1.ed  by  a.  number  of basic truths,.  The  result of twenty years' 
application of the  CAP  is positive.  Set  against what  has been achieved, 
its total cost is not  excessive.  Every country needs  an agricultural 
policy and it is  to~orth  remembering that the policies pursued by the 
Cow~unity's main competitors are  just as costly,  even when  compared 
~dth Conw~"lity and national expenditure  combined3 
Because of the very success of the  CAP  and  improvements in agricultural 
productivity  7  the  Commission believes tha,t  adjustments  ought  to be 
made  so that it will be easier to control the effects of the operation 
of market  organizations (surpluses  and cost to the budget)o  It 
believes  ~hat this can be achieved  •~thout jettisoning the  three 
interrelated principles on which this policy has  alwa,ys  rested. -9-
The best vlcy  of'  ensuring the  su.rvi  val of the CAP  is to ma.1<:e  the 
aijustments ;,rhich its success demands  calmly  a."'ld  bef'ore it is too 
late. 
But  to do this l•re  must  have  a  clear idea of the kind of agriculture 
The modernization process on which competitiveness 
depe:c:ds  must  be  pursued7  but it must  be reconciled "tvith the need to 
avoid  a  massive flight from the land vJhich  would  be  qu.ite mracceptable 
i:-:1  the present  situa-tion.  Hence the Corru:lission'  s  desire to remain 
alive to the problems of the incomes of small farmers  and  he~dicapped 
resions.  But  preserving employment  in a.oOTiculture  is  L~portant for 
aJJ.other  r·eason:  one  of the specific fu."'lctions  of Community 
agriculture is to contribute to social,  regional  and  ecological 
equilibria through the diversity of farm  structures. 
If ,,,e  can agree  on clea:r options,  ·!:;he  rest is mainly a  matter of 
-&echnioal  de·!; ail calling for  a  little imagination.  But if this 
~gTeement is not  forthcoming,  it will be  a  sign that we  do  not  even 
1G"101>~'  in which direction we  want  to  go., 
The  United Kingdom's  budget  problem has perhaps been the biggest 
obstacle to  a  satisfactory conclusion to discussions on the 
Corr:lrl:unity 9s  f'uture. 
~Je  should be quite clear about  the reasons for the deadlock.  To 
begin uith, the economic  c:.·isis leaves nothing to  spare in natio:'lcl 
bucge~cs,  2,.,.'1.d  contributions to the Community  budget  are therefore 
vi8::·,_:;d  - :r·ather  short-sightedly - as  a  luxury to  be kept for more 
prosye~ous times.  There  are also differences of opinion about  the 
f-;.:::}c"'~:::.on  of the  Co;-~:=uni  ty budget:  it is not an equalization mecha..."lism - 10-
gi\lG  back exactly ·v.rhat  each has  paid in:  nor is it strictly 
~'T0  have  or:.ly to look at the relative  sizes of 
which  c:mounts to o.Wio  of the  COID.l11U..Yli ty product' 
' 
s 1  i-.rhi.ch  account  for about  50:fo  of national products. 
Fir.aJ.  t>1-::;re  a::e  dj_ffering vievJS  about  hoerr  the budget  should develop 
The  CorY1D1ission  remai::::s  convinced that the 
d8VCl  of  corc.mon  policies cannot  be  constraj_ned. by an arbitrary 
lirrit-3:tiOll  Ol":'t.  th:3  resou:r-ces  a.vailablev 
tl:i  s  l:~u_st  r.:.o-t  lectd to  a.dr.a.i ssion of -tl1e  H fa.ir  ret"U.rns0  principle  1  1r1h:i. ch 
But  the difficulty 
is f:Lnc..:-::.ced  solely from  m-n:1 
:r·esou..rces 1  vi;;:-tually  a:Ll  the  available margin Nould  ·be  used up. 
Li:;:e  Pa::-licunent 5  the  Commission has never taken the  vievJ that  the 
Co:.:u--.rr~"li ty• s  :future can be  dictated by the  1%  limit;  -v:e  have  no 
in~;e:n.tion,.  ei  t:c.er~  of  slowing down  development  of. our structural 
policies or giving up  joint financing of the  common  agricultural policy. 
To  do  sc Hould be to accept  stagnation. 
But  taking the  step of proposing nevJ  ovm  resou.Tces is much  more  than 
a  ·cn.:.Cigc-ta.ry  ma.ttero  It means  persuading the Member States,  national 
pc:.ri.ia:r,ent s  aYJd  public opinion that  the  Community has  something to 
offer -v;hich  v;ar::cants  a  further transfer of resources. 


















l - 11  -
to put  a  convincing Community  project to our people.  This must 
surely be the overriding priority for the remainder of your term 
of office and  ours. 
0 
0  0 
A great deal of time  and  effort has gone  into discussing the three 
facets of the Commission's report.  At  the beginning of January 
I  myself tried to t..rork  out  a:  compromise  solution at the Foreign 
Ministers' request,  but to no  avail..  .Agreement  still eludes us. 
It is hard to view this deadlock with equanimity. 
The  bones of contention mey- appear trivial:  ma.:nagement  of the milk 
sector, the trend of agricultural  expenditure and  tech.~ical details 
of measures to help the United Kingdom.  ~  fear is that they have 
proved intractable  b~cause they are simply a  front for our 
governments'  v1aning  commitment  to E-.l.I"ope  or at least for fundamental 
difference·s on the structure and purpose of the Community. 
I  have  no  vnsh to minimize the  importa~ce of the points on which 
agreement  \tl&S  reached by the European C;;;u.:1oil.  These  i:uclude new Community  policies in sectors such  as industry1  energy,  research and 
development  a~d an increase in the Community's  borrowing and  lending 
capacity  .. 
:My  immediate  aim  is to try to persuade governments  to  come  to an 
overall agreement  as  soon as possible,  at the latest at the European 
Council in 1-:Ia.rch.  The  talks \vhich  Mr  Tindemans  and  I  will be having 
•rith the Member  States in the 'weeks  ahead will enable us to see how 
far their views coincide on revitalization of the integration process 
and  how  the idea might  be made  more  attractive to the general public. 
If there really is a  political basis,  I  am  sure we  can reach a 
reasonable compromise  on the remaining problems,  which will then 
become  technical rather than political.  This House  will be kept 
fully informed. 
Eut  if - God  forbid - we  are forced to admit  defeat within the 
Council,  we  will have to ask ourselves,  in all honesty,  whether the 
1-iember  States have lost. interest in a  united Europe  and whether the 
present Community  has lost its capacity to take decisions. 
Faced with this identity crisis, the Commission would  have to make 
a  complete appraisal of what  the Community  is and  what  it is to 
become,  without losing sight of the gravity of the situation and its 
institutional role.  This House  may  rest assured that the Commission 
will involve it in its appraisal. - 14-
ECONOI,'iiC  R.ECOVERY 
For me1ny  years  1101:1  the Cormnu.."li ty has made  nothing like full use  of 
its Gconomio  potential.  This has  l@d  to a  aeemingly inexorable rise 
in unemployment.  There is little inclination to invest because 
industry sees no  point in increasing production capacity irlhen 
existing plant is already lying idle. 
Hopes  of a  recovery have been dashed time and again.  Moderate 
grovnh •vas  forecast  for 1981, but the  economy contracted instead  • 
•  11.  fe~"<'"  ~veeks ago we  were still hoping for a  'Cfo  increase in GDP  in 
1982;  it nov•  seems that this forecast might  have to be revised dowm1ards. 
The  time has  come  to take a  .critical look at our  economic policies. 
I  am  not  suggesting that we  should abandon  our policies of restraint 
2~d control,  particularly on money  supply,  public finance  and incomes. 
Those  policies are still essential,  even if we  can be forgiven for 
being  some~·rhat discouraged by the fruits they have borne  so far. 
But, 1vhile lve  continue a  policy of restraint,  v-re  must  also try to 
create a  more  favourable  environment  for  employment  a~d investmento 
~·Je  cannot  afford -to  sit back and Ivai t  for g:rmvth  to return of its 
ol'm  accord Hhen the present process of acljustment is completeo 
The  reasons -vrhy  I  lay such  emphasis  on  investment  a."ld  eli1plo;yment  is 
that  they are both the main  goal  of our  economic  policy and the 
best  ~vay of achieving it..  I  am  duty bound.  to  ma~e unemployment  the 
focs,l  point  of our  concern in order to avoid leaving our young 
people  a  legacy  of submission a11d  humiliation"  Our  societies 
must  show  that they are resilient  enough to buunce back. - 15  ·~· 
not  go  aHay unless  \·Je  have  a  strategy to drive it away1  an1 tb.e  llAart 
of this strategy must  be top priority for  investment. 
'I'his is not  a  nevJ  idea.  It was  the  theme  in the  foreword to the 
f'ifth medium-term  economic policy progra.rnme.  Along these lines,  then, 
I  propose that  a  plan· be  launched at  Community  level to  give  ne\-J  impetus 
-to  :.:,:;:::.:; ~~:;·G:rt  by providing  Conu"lluni ty contributions to  top up  national measures. 
In the first  place,  investment must  be taken to mean  public  investment 
in the vJider  sense  of the  term.  Not  only must  \ve  modernize  our 
infrastructure,  but  above  all ;We  must  step up  energy investments. 
The  challenge of the eighties will be  the  challenge of energy,  and 
our response  to it will to  a  large extent  determine the  outcome  of 
the battle for employment. 
Investment  in energy improves  employment  prospects in two  ways:  like 
all investment it helps to increase the level of activity.  But  it also 
eases the strain that the oil bill imposes  on the balance of payments. 
In 1981  this bill amounted to 4%  of Community  GDP. - 16-
That  figure  shows  more  clearly than words  how  little leeway 
vm  have left in working to>-va:rds  our growth  and  employment 
objectives.  We  must  recover that  leew~. Governments  have 
a  decisive role to play in energy investment policy,  not  least 
because  they provide a  large part of the money. 
But  investment is above all a  matter for businesses,  and in 
most Hember States rates of profitability are not high enough 
to provide the necessar,y incentivee Profit margins must  be 
restored and  improved,  by wage  control in the first place, 
followed by appropriate fiscal measures.  But  businessmen 
must  be  given assurances  of a  more  stable and predictable 
economy if they are to be expected to be more  positive in 
their thinking and  planning. 
One  such assurance wouldibe for governments  to demonf;!trate 
} 
clearly their determination to tackle the crisis  eff~otively 
a-~d guarantee monetar.y stability. The  proposals that  ~he 
Commission will shortly be  putting forward for the consolidation 
of the  ~~s, to which  I  shall return later,  should be  seen as 
a  step in that direction. 
Ir..terest rates play an important  part in investment decisions_ 
The  rise in recent months  has been caused by external factors, 
particularly United States monetary policy.  Only if we  concert 
our  actio~ within the Community  and put up a  common  front 
against the  .~ericans can we  hope  to reduce the dissuasive 
effect of current interest rates. - 17-
s  true 1  lie 
2,:n  to ensure that national efforts are all moving  in the  same  direction 
0;1  supplyi~c':tg the  frame\·mrk for a  coherent plan of action designed to 
achieve  maxirau:n  effectiveness and  complementarity., 
The  Co,TJTrLm.ity  also has budgetary means,  albeit very modest  7  and more 
substantial financial resources which have  been regularly increased in 
recent years and  concentrated more  and more  on energy..  This  must  continue 
so  that the  Co~@Dnity will be able to back up  the action the Member 
States decide  to take.  This is where  we  will  see  just how  important it 
is for the New  Corr~Q~ity Instrument  to be  expanded. 
Another contribution the  Conmn.tnity  can  make  to promoting investment  and 
industrial development  is to  lay the foundations for an industrial 
strategy..  'llhis  must  rest first and foremost  on  the  internal market, 
v;hich needs to be protected from the  many  assaults being made  on it 
and  strengthened  so that it can play its mm vital role  in the creation 
of a  mod.c;;rn  industrial base.  Here  I  would refer you to the paper 
presented by the  Cominission last October.  The  aim is to  create a 
genuine  Europe~'1 industrial area on the basis of real  CorruTJuni ty 
preference  deriving from consolidation cf the  internal market, 
establishment  of the  legal framework for formingEuropean  companies, 
stronger incentives for research,  development  and innovation and bold 
measures concerning public procurement  designed ultimately to break 
national monopolies. 
Investment  creates jobs,  both directly and indirectly.  But  with 
~~employment ,increasing,  we  carrnot  simply wait for economic  expansion 
to start producing its effects in the medium  or long term.  1'le  must 
rr.aintain an unflagging search for ways  of stimulating demand  for labour, 
.. - 18-
making recruitment  easier,  and eliminating difficulties caused by 
administrative formalities,  legal requirements  and traditions. 
Here  too,  the  main  work will be  done  in the rl.iember  States or in the 
regions.  But  the  Community  has its part to play,  and in the  coming 
months  we  Hill give proper  shape to the  ideas outlined in the 
J;fandate  Report  and the  subsequent  communications •.  ,  We  will begin by 
working out  a  common  approach  on matters  such as vocational training 
and the  reorganization of working time  to support whatever action is 
taken in each  of our countries and preclude any distortions of 
competition. 
The  rules and operation of our major  structural funds will then have 
to be  revievJed  so that  they can be better tailored to  meet  present-day 
needs.  You  already have  our proposals for reform  of the Regional 
F~~d.  We  are also  seeing how  the  rules of the European Social Fund 
could be  similarly revised and we  expect to be  able to present 
proposals to you in the next  few  weeks.  These  two  instruments will 
not  simply complement  i"hat  is being done  in each cmmtry.,  We  intend 
that  they  should themselves  create incentives for  improving 
development  and  increasing employmente 
Finally,  't':Te  must  together do  something specific on the  employment 
front  along the lines of the project already proposed by the  Co:rnrnission, 
vib.ich  is designed to offer young people between the age of sixteen 
a...'1d  eighteen an alternative 'to m1.emplo;;rment  in the :form  of vocational 
t~aining 7  further  schooling or concrete  job experience. 
These,  then,  are the  main  lines in the battle for employment  an~ 
investment..  The  Comr.nmi ty is confronted  ~.ri th a  need for  change ivhioh 
is almost  as p,ressing as after the  Second Horld War..  ~lhat is at 
stake is its ability to maintain its position among the industrialized 
:r..ations,  to transform the wi,d3s:pread  feelL--:g  of resignation vlhich 
cm...,re:r..tly  prevails among  t:J:.e  young b.tc a  :r:Till  to vlin,  and.  to fil::i 
the  >vay  fcr-..·;aJ.~d.  ono3 again in pursui-::  of  cc;:n;;J.on  objective;;;  .. - 19  -
important  for three reasons: 
r~~;.1«Jnt  dli!lvt'lJopment~5~  in  int~rn~ttion~l  mol.'l.et~,ry rGlo:bions  have 
appreciably  increa~ed instability in exchange rates and 
interest ratesj  the  Comm~~ity must  make  it clear that it is 
determined to reduce this uncertainty; 
the fact that the EI1S  has 'tvorked  well  since it Has  se·li  up  gives 
omple  justification for strengthening the system; 
it 1·J'ill  pave the >-.ray  for an institutional development  later. 
The  ac:tion vJhich  the Commu..."li ty will have to talce is on  two  frontso 
Firstly,  on  the internal front,  the following measures v1ould  be 
required: 
improvements to the internal coherence of the  system (adjustments 
to the process of creating ECUs,  consolidation of the existing 
n1echanisms  by the development  of intra-marginal intervention in 
Community  currencies) ; 
promotion  of the use of the ECU; 
tangible progress in achieving convergence  of economic  performances  ... 
(because  any strengthening of the system is doomed  to failure if 
the method and the results of coordinating policies are not 
considerably improved). 
But  there is an external  dimension  to development  of the EM:S, 
't·ihich  is particularly critical in the present world situation:  the 
5radual  establishment  of effective monetary cooperation,  organized 
in the first  ~nstance vrith the United States, will be a  vital factor 
in the success  of the EMS  in the near future.  For many  months  now 
the Commission has been pressing for talks on  changes to be made  in 
relations with the dollar:  today the need for these talks is more 
urgent  than ever. - 20-
For the Commission,  this restatement  of European monetary identity, 
which is undeniably fraught  with problems,  has a  double  ~mbolic 
value  since it affects both mutual  solidarity and discipline.  I  see 
it as a  test of our capacity to take  decisions together and hence 
of our political cohesion. 
\ 
This view of the  ~IS will guide  the  Commission  in making whatever 
proposals are necessary. 
~------ ---- ---·~-- ---·----- ---- ·- ·~-·- ----
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EXTERlif.AL  RELATIONS 
itlt- '?i  q  .  ~ 
Our  external relations remit  is particularly important this year 
with the  economic  crisis sha:rpening tensions on the international 
scene  and East-West  relations under strain. 
"  The  credibility of our external relations policy is·a function of our 
internal  cohesion and  our ability to act  consistently on behalf 
of the  Community.  i'Je  must  accept  one  basic fact:  as  soon as 
there is the  slightest  suspicion that  we  are not  operating from 
a.."l  agreed position,  our policy is weakened.  This is why  the 
Coa~ission's ability to negotiate varies  from  one  set of talks 
to another.  If the  individual Member  States conduct  parallel 
discussions,  the  Community's negotiating clout is obviously 
reducedo  For  instance,  the  Commission carries more  weight  in 
international discussions  on steel and agricultural products 
tha..'1  it does  in talks on energy and monetary matters. 
This  general  observation applies particularly to relations 
with Japan,  a  country which is exceptionally competitive in 
so many  areas. 
Japan and the  Community  are  equally bound  by  internationally 
accepted rules.  The  Community is justifiably concerned by 
the  imbalance  in the development  of its relations  Trri th Japan 
and by the  worsening of its  trade deficit.  If Japan is to face  up 
to its responsibilities as  an international  power,  it must  help - 22  -
to make  our economic  system  work,  accepting the  constraints along 
\"Iith  the  advantages.  It should open up its domestic market,  and  I 
am  thinking here  of'  economic  activity in general,  not  just iradaq 
1::1  ba.nl-cing  and  services1 for instance,  the  Japanese  shm.lld  allow our firms 
the  sa::ne  degree  of access  as  we  allaH theirs.  Furthermore  1  Japan 
m~J.st  recog11i ze  the  need for voluntary restraint  on certain exports, 
for it stands to  gain if VJe  succeed in putting our economic  house 
in order..  This is the  philosophy underlying the  present negotiations. 
T;:le  Commission  t~?elcomes the market  liberalization measures  recently 
a:.mou:aced  by the  Japanese  Gover:runent  as  a  step in the right 
directione  But it feels that the  obstacles to exporting to Japan 
are still formidable..  IJ:•his  is i·Jhy  it believes that  a  new initiative 
is called  for~  It has  therefore proposed to the  Council that 
negotiations i-Jith the Japanese  be  actively pursued within  GATT, 
under  P~ticle 23.  Only if the  Community acts as  an entity-
perhaps in concert  vJi th other  GATT  members  - can it hope  for 
positive results. 
In the  long term our success. in meeting the Japanese  challenge 
will  depend  on vJhether or not  vJe  are  capable of providing the 
Community with an industrial strategy that will favour the 
emergence  of competitive European firms  in the industries of the 
future.  I  made this point  efli'lier on. 
The  development  of our  economic relations with the Eastern bloc 
has been put  in jeopardy by the  drama  in Poland and  by East-West 
tem:ion;  all the difficulties latent in close relations between 
tvm  such different political models  and the  ambiguity this inevitably 
eugenders  on the  economic  front  have  suddenly been brought .to the 
surface.  ~Je  have  a  difficult choice  ahead of us. - 23-
It is clear that there can be no  question o£  business as usual. 
He  deplore the brutal stifling of the hopes  of the Polish 
people.  The  Community  must  support  any moves  to end the 
present oppression. 
We  had welcomed  the recent .increase in trade between East  and 
Hest,  despite differences in political and  economic  systems. 
Tod~ progress towards the normalization of relations between 
the Community  ~~d Eastern Europe has been halted. 
But  perhaps our main concern is the deterioration of relations 
idth the United States,  a  country with which we  have  so many 
linkso  Our differences could escalate into  something much 
more  serious than the present trade dispute which has been 
exacerbated by the economic  crisis and  b,y  domestic problems. 
We  get the impression that Europe  and the United States are 
begirLning to doubt  and hence distrust each other. 
This development  can be traced back to unfavourable interpretation 
of reactions on both sides of the Atlantic to recent political 
crises in various parts of the worlde  It also reflects the 
changes which have radically reshaped  American  and European 
... - 24  -
society since the war,  influencing new generations and giving 
birth to new ideologies. 
Ag<:dnst  ~.:.his  backgrotmd,  trade tensions in steel and  agriculture, 
tho;;;.gh  not  nevJ?  assume  an added dimension;  more difficult to 
deal id  th on their Oh'll  merits  7  they are the rock on which the 
commercial  and  economic pact which has linked us for  so  long 
ird.th the United States could well founder  .. 
I  am  convinced,  rightly I  hope,  that vlith the help of 
meanir.lg'ful  dialogue the strong ties of common  values,  strategic 
interests and  a  shared destiny will enable us to preserve  a 
strong and  balanced alliance. 
This does not preclude keen competition between Europe  and 
America,  ru1d  economic  competition can still, at times, 
degenerate into conflict.  The  strategy worked  out with the 
United  States is quite clear:  preservation of an open trading 
system  and strict compliance  'l!li th the GATT  rules.  We  will not 
iriaver in our determination to ensure that the rules of the game 
are applied 1-1i thout distinc-tion by  one  and all., 
But  our differences with the United States are more  than purely 
commercial..  Of particular concern to me  are our  d.i  vergent 
vie1:-;s  on 1Iorth-South relations  and  on the form  and substance 
of :future dialogue  • 
.A.rne:dcan  economic  and monetary policy and its corollaries - a 
bt.edget  irt deficit and  high interest rates - aJ."'e  imposing enormous 
bv.rd.ens  on the entire wlestern  economy"  The  cotmtries of the 
l.:tlantic Alliance have  now reached  such  a  degree of economic 
int'":::rdependence  tha.t the preservation and  development  o:f  trade - 25-
Hithin the Alliance is not  feasible without  closer coordination of 
eQQnomis  ps~iG¥•  FQil~ni th~s,  lfig~•&l1nr.§O@fi~mio  nest~~i~t 
would  soon lead to political tension. 
The  economic  crisis is undoubtedly generating and  aggravating 
tensions in Community  relations with East  and West  alike,  but 
its real victims  are the developing countries. 
The  current  deadlock  in the North-South Dialogue makes  the 
consolidation and expansion of organized cooperation between the 
Ten  and the various groups  of developing countries more  urgent 
than ever.  If the  Community  does not  wish to lose the political 
credibility built up  on the  strength of its development  record, 
it cannot  afford to  abandon its objectives for the North-South 
Dialogue,  as  set  out  in the report  endorsed by the 
European  Council  in June  last year;  it can act either on its 
o~m,  or in conjunction with its Western partners or in 
association with like-minded oil-producing countries,  but  act 
it must. 
Ten years  ago  the Paris Summit  la.id the foundations  for the 
Community's  development  policy.  Preparations for the renewal  of 
the  Lome  II Convention are  about  to start,  and this is an 
opportru~ity for rethinking the aims,  geographical bias  and 
instruments of action on this front.  The  Commission would like to 
organize  a  debate,  involving Parliament  and the  Council,  to 
formulate  the  nu.oleus  of its development  policy for the eighties. 
It will  present  the  relevant  proposals by the  summer.  At  the 
same  time it will press on resolutely with the  campaign to  combat 
hunger in the  Horld,  notably by means  of the  plan of action 
adopted by the  Council  at its instigation in November. ------------------·------------------~·------------------------
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He  have  talked of the tensions affecting relations with our 
majo:r·  He:Jtern trn.ding partners,  >-.ti th the Eastern 'bloc  end with 
the  d.eveloping world i  there is a  lesson to be  learned from 
all three.  And  it is this:  more  than ever before,  the  Community 
must  react with  a  single voice to  events  on the international 
scene,  and  adopt  a  single,  coherent  position,  to defend its 
legitimate interests and affirm its political and cultural 
identity. - 27-
I  N S  T  I  T U T  I  0  N A L  MATTERS 
Before  concluding,  I  shGuld like to say som\ii'lihing  about  the 
institutional problems  facing the  Community  today.  Some  oall for 
immediate  attention~ others are  linked to its long-term 
development. 
In my  programme  address last year I  stressed the  supreme  importance 
of restoring good working relations betv<een the  Community  institutions. 
It is,  I  think,  inherent  in the  Community  structure that Parliament, 
the  Council  and the  Commissibn  should vie with each other for 
influence.  But  there must  be  sufficient cooperation between them 
to  allow constructive solutions to emerge  at the  end of the day. 
This has not  always  been the  case - the budget  is just one  example 
albeit  a  notable  one.  The  Commission is glad that there  are at last 
to  be  consultations between the institutions on the classification of 
expenditure  and firmly intends to participate to the full.  We  are 
hoping for  a  political solution which will obviate the need for 
reference to the  Court  of Justice and will open up the prospect  of 
a  trouble-free budgetary procedure. 
But  apart from this esoteric squabble  about the budget,  what  are  our 
real problems?  They  are,  as  anyone  who  keeps  abreast  of Community 
affairs Hill know,  Parliament's inadequate  powers  and the  Council's 
inability to take decisions. 
This House  envisaged a  number  of ways  of strengthening its role in 
the resolutions it adopted  l~st July.  But  the  immediate  course  of 
action open to us is to  improve  and  strengthen the conciliation 
procedure.  Last  December  we  sent  a  proposal to you and to the 
' 
Council.  "\·Je  v;ill continue  our efforts to  see that the Presidents of - 28-
the three institutions consider the matter and reach a  decision 
before  summer. 
It is of funda.11ental  importam;e to the  Commtmi ty that the  Council 
conc;_uer  its inability to take decisions.  To  overcome this central 
obstc:,::::le  ou.r  governments  and nations must  renew their political 
commitment  to European integration.  But  in the everyday running of 
the  Ccr:J.munity,  'things vwuld be  so much  easier if the rules of the 
Treat;)' vJere  applied - by this,  of course,  I  mean  the use  of majority 
voting in the many  areas  where it was  intended~  .And  indeed 'vider 
use  of majority voting is coming back into favour.  Mr Tindemans 
has made  his intentions on this subject very clear and the  Commission 
will  stand by him  and  do  everything it can to persuade members  of the 
Co~~cil to face up to their responsibilities. 
Wnen  'N"e  tackle our immediate  problems,  we  should never lose sight  of 
our longer-term objective. 
The  Commission's  views  on European Union  and its commitment  to the 
idea are  v1ell  known  to this House  and  I  will not  repeat  them here. 
He  have  \velcomed  the recent initiative taken by Mr  Genscher  and 
¥~Colombo, mru1y  of whose  priorities coincide withLmine.  The 
Commission will play its role in the examination of the  Genscher-Colombo 
initiative and be  guided by the following considerations: 
11e  need to preserve  and  develop what  we  already have.  In developing 
nevJ  Hays  of i'Vorking  together,  such as extending the activities of 
intergovernmental  cooperation as proposed in the draft Act,  we  must 
ensure that  the integration process is safeguarded and  strengthened, 
and the  cornerstpne of that process is,  and must  continue to be,  the Treatieso i  '.  ' 
- 29-
The  Commi6sion is  obvio~~ly in favour  of extending political 
cooperation to areas not  previously covered  such as security 
matters.  But it does not believe that this can or  should be 
regarded as a  substitute for progress in developing common 
policies or used as  a  prete,xt for failing to tackle policy 
difficulties. 
I  vJOuld  like to say one final  ~wrd about your new  Comrni ttee 
on Institutional ?.coblems.  1ve  '\vel come  this initiative and are 
fully m·rare  of the difficulty of the task undertaken.  'tve  are 
prepared to go  ivi th you along this path.  We  will give you all 
the practical and technical  assistance we  can and will involve 
you in deliberations  on  political issues. 
.. - 30  --
I  ..vould  not  like t  ·'  leave you with the  impression that the 
Co:mrnission  v-rill  devote all its attention to the major  issues 
I  have  just discussed,  neglecting the rest of its outline 
programme.  This would be  quite false.  There  is obviously 
no  question of,  say,  fisheries  and  enlargement taking a 
bac:k  seat.  Indeed,  the  Commission will make  a  d.etermined 
effort to ensure that  concrete progress is made  in these 
two  areas before  1982 is out. 
* 
*  * - 31  -
CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from  my  analysis that the Commission  has a  special 
mission at this juncture:  to convince the Member  States and 
the general public that there is no  alternative to the Community, 
that it is the only effective remedy for the ills that plague us. 
The  Community  has  tw·o  options:  it can admit defeat in the face 
of centrifugal forces,  or it can fight on to attain a  higher 
level of integration and  development. 
For the Commission there is no  choice.  It cannot  contemplate 
surrender.  It will fight  on. TALSMANDENS GRUPPE- SPRECHERGRUPPE- SPOKESMAN'S  GROUP- GROUPE  DU PORTE-PAROLE 
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EMBARGO:  TUESDAY, 
PRESSE·MEDDEUlSE • MITTEilUNG  AN  DIE  PRESSE •  PRIH-RfHHf~lffiliAifiNJO.Niill.:!!!.: 
ANAIDINDIH riA TON  TYRO •  INfDRMAZIDNE AllA STAMPA •  MEDEDEUNG IAN  DE  PERS 
Brussels,  16  February  1982 
Extracts  from  the  Address  by  Mr  Gaston  Thorn,  President of the  Commission, 
presenting  the  Commission's  programme  for  1982  to the  European  Parliament 
The  Community is in danger. ·  Within its frontiers  cohesion is 
compromisecl by the  economic crisis which is rousing the old demons 
of protectionism,  the illusio::c. tha.t  salvation lies in going it 
alone.  . Outside, the  Community  is, having to contend  T.-li th the 
aggressive behaviour of its trading partners just when it should 
be working,for the  surviva~ of its traditional industries and 
promoting the rise. of those which hold  the key to., industrial 
development in the future. 
of i:n  ·~e:rms  <jf'  a  :::>adica.l  change  of st:rtwtu.rH  •or  the  nc::ed  to 
:resh.3.pe  our ci.vihza.ti.on.  Bui:  I  am  not  here  to p:rtH1Gh  defeatism. 
The  poEtical op•tions  tba.:t  .t  will  D"t  +.c).'V'OU  cr····  ·i>';ilt>6-'  ""'l'"'t 
'  ....  ~,..>-.  "'..- t.l  - """""""'"f  .A._.  ••  v,_ ...,_  '-";....;,  .\J.A  .{., ..  )  '  ,, 
serve  as  a  springbc·a.rd  f'or  the  re1rit;:1i.zati.:n:. of the  Comrnun:i.ty~ 
The  Gocl.Illunity must  emerge  from  it:.>  p1•es:-,nt  ".;rirn.l.]_atic·r:s  mo::-e 
'I'he  aJ"'~ernatiYe is irreversible  dec~d.ne for  the  natio:a.s  of 
----·----·----· 
THE  ECONOMIC  AND  P  0  L I  T I  C A L  CONTEXT 
The  economic  situation within the Community is still disturbing  •. 
In fact it worsened in some  respects during 1981.  I  am  thi~~ing 
above all of unemployment,  which has  reached proportions 
unprecedented since the  en~.  of"- the war.  At  the erA of last year 
no  less than 10 260 000 people 1rrere  looking for work.  That's 
9-2%  of the active population and an increase of 28%  in one  year! 
KOMMISSIONEN  FOR  DE  E.lJ.f!OPJEISKE  F.IELLESSKABER - KOMMISSION  DER  EUROPAISCHEN  GEMEINSCHAFTEN 
COMMISSION OF  THE  EtiROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  - COMMISSION  DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES - EniTPOnH  TON EYPOnAIKON  KOINOTHTON 
COMMISSIONE DELLE COMUNITA EUROPEE  - COMMISSIE VAN  DE  EUROPESE GEMEENSCHAPPEN The  Community  could not survive the destruction of the  ~ingle market. 
If it v1ere  to founder,  the Community's  policies -the common  commercial 
policy for instance- would lose their raison d 1etre.  Even the common 
agricultural ·policy,  founded  on the twin pillars of free internal trade 
and  Comrour~ty preference,  would not last long.  Recent  events illustrate 
this all too clearly. 
Our  relations tod.th  the United States and Japan are getting more  and. 
more  strained as the crisis bites deeper.  A major dispute is building 
up  over  the  trade  balance • 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
I  might  be lezs concerned about the trade problem if our differences of 
opinion ~~th the United States did not  extend to such major  issues as 
north-south relations,. if the international situation were not  so unstable. 
THE  MAY  MANDATE 
The  best via{!  of ensuring the survival of the  C.AP  is to make  the 
eijustments which its success demands  calmly and  before it is too 
late. 
:Bu.t  to do  this "t-Ie  must  have  a  clear idea of the kind of'  agriculture 
Europe v-rant s.  The  modernization process on which  competitiveness 
depends must  be pursued,  but it must  be reconciled with the need to 
avoid  a  m.a.ssive  flight  from the land v1hich  would  be quite unaccepte..ble 
---- ;.., 
in the present  situation. 
'--- -----~-----
3 
But  taking the  step of proposing ne-..:  ovm resources is much  more  thru 
a  bud.getary matter.  It means  persuading the Member  States,  nationa: 
par:iaments and public opinion that the  Co~~unity has  something to 
offer v-;hich.  v:arrants  a  further transfer of resources.  This House 
and the  Commission is now  faced with a  ne-v;  imperative: 
to put  a  convincing Community  project to our people.  This must 
surely be the overriding priority for the remainder of your term 
of office and  ours  •• • · 
........................ 
My  immediate  aim  is to try to persuade governments  to  come  to an 
overall agreement  as  soon as possible,  at the latest at the European 
Council in 11Ia.rch.  The  talks which Mr Tindemans  and  I  will be having 
\dth the Member  states in the 'weeks  ahead will enable us to see how 
'far their views coincide on revitali'zation of the integration process 
and  how  the idea might  be made  more  attractive to the general public. 
-------~--- ------------~----
ECONOHIC  RECOVERY 
For ma.Y'.y  years now  the Cormnuni ty has made  nothing like full use of 
its  ~conomic potential.  This has led to a  aeeminsly inexorable rise 
in unemployment.  There is little inclination to invest because 
industry sees no  point in increasing production capacity when 
existing plant is already lying idle. 
Hopes  of a  recovery have been dashed time and again.  Moderate 
grovlth was  forecast for 1981 7  but the economy. contracted instead. 
A fet.,r  tveeks  ago  ~ve  were still hoping for a  cfo  increase in GDP  in 
1982;  it nm-1  seems  that this  for~cast might  have to be revised downwards. 
The  time has  come  to take a  .critical look at our  economic policies. 
I  am  not  suggesting that we  should abandon  our policies of restraint 
and control, particularly on  money  supply  7  public finance  and incomes. 
Those policies are still essential,  even if we  can be forgiven for 
I 
being  some~·;rhat  discouraged by the fruits they have borne  so far. 
But, while we  continue a  policy of restraint, we  must  also try to 
create a  more  favourable  environment  for  employment  ~~d investment. 
'tfe  ca:ro.not  afford to sit back and wait for gTowth  to return o'f its 
ovm  accord 111hen  the present process of adjustment is complete. The  reasons -vihy  I  lay such  emphasis  on  investment  and  employment  is 
that they are both the main goal  of our  economic  policy and the 
best t'fay  of achieving it..  I  a.'T!  duty bound to  ma.~e unemployment  the 
focal  point  of'  our concern in order to avoid leavin.P"  ,  a  our young 
people a  legacy  of'  submission  ~~d humiliation~  ~Qr societies 
~u~! ~~~w that they  __  ~~--resilient  enough to bounce back. 
:·Ie  must  ouild.  o11r·  economic  fut'll''~  curse]_vesi  a:1d  not  wait  for Providence 
to reveal to us  8nGe  again the:  lost secret  c•f'  grmvth,.  'I'he  crisis will 
not  go  <.H·1ay  unless  t·Je  have  a  strategy to drive it away,  a.nd.  the heart 
or~ this strategy must  be  top prfority f'or  investment. 
'l'his is not  a  nevl  idea.  It was  the theme  in the  foreword to the 
fifth medium-term  economic policy programme.  Along these lines, then, 
I  propose that a  plan be  launched at  Community  level to give  new  impetus 
to  i.r:'.~·czt:r.cnt  by providing Community  contributions to top u.p  _  national measures. 
···············--·-·········  The  action which the Community vlill have to take is on  t1'ro  fronts. 
Firstly,  on  the internal front,  the following measures would be 
required: 
improvements to the internal coherence of the  system (adjustments 
to the process of creating ECUs,  consolidation of'  the existing 
mechanisms by the development  of'  intra-marginal intervention in 
Community  currencies); 
promotion of the use  of'  the ECU; 
tangible progress in achieving convergence  of'  economic  performances  ... 
(because  any strengthening of'  the  system is doomed  to failure if' 
the- method and the results ,of'  coordinating policies are not 
.  ~-. 
considerably improved). 
But there is an external  dimension  to development  of the  ~~s, 
v1hich  is _particularly critical in the present· world situation:  the 
gradual  establishment  of'  effective monetary cooperation,  organized 
in the first  ~nstance with the United States, will be a  vital factor 
in the  success of the EJ:.:!S  i,n  the near future.  For many months  now 
the Commission  has  bee~ pressing for talks on  changes to be made  in 
relations w·i th the dollar:  today the need for these talks is more 
urgent than ever  • 
.  For the Commission,  this restatement  of European monetary identity, 
wh3oh  is undeniably fraught with  pro~lems, has a  double  s.ymbolic 
_va~~_it  affec~s both_  mutual  so~~darity  _and  disc_iplin~-· 5 
EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
If  Japan  is to face  up  to  its responsibilities  as  an  international  power, 
it must  help to  make  our  economic  system  work,  accepting  the  constraints 
along  with  the advantages • 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
The  Commission  welcomes  the market  liberalization measures  recently 
announced by the Japanese  Go:;rernment  as  a  step in the right 
direction.  But  it feels that the obstacles to exporting to Japan 
are still formidable.  This is why  it believes that  a  new  initiative 
is called for.  It has therefore proposed to the  Council that 
negotiations with the Japanese be' actively pursued within  GATT, 
under Article  23.  Only if the  Community  acts as  an entity-
perhaps in concert with other  GATT  members  - can it hope  for 
positive reaults.  --------
..................... 
It is clear that there can be no question of business as usual. 
1-le  deplore the brutal stifling of the hopes of the Polish 
.  , people  • 
.  ,  ... ,  The  Community  must  support ~  moves  to end the 
present oppression. 
.  .................... . 
Tod~ progress towards the normalization of relations between 
the Community  and Eastern Europe has been halted  • 
.--. -----~---------- - ' 
Moreover,  these  retations  are  sure  to  remain  seriously affected 
for  as  long  as  martial  law  and  repression,  imposed  as  a  result  of 
Soviet  pressure,  persists  in  Poland • 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . ·-----------------·· 
6 
United  States 
But  perhaps our main concern is the deterioration of relations 
with the United States,  a  country with which we  have  so  ma.tzy" 
links.  Our differences could escalate into something much 
more  serious than the present trade dispute which has been 
exacerbated qy the  economic crisis and  b,y  domestic problems. 
~1e get the impression that Europe  and the United  States are 
'  beginning to doubt  and hence distrust each other. 
--"  ~--------- ----------~-
....................... 
This does not preclude keen competition between Europe  and 
America,  and  economic  competiti~n can still, at times, 
degenerate into conflict.  The  strategy worked  out with the 
United States is quite clear:  preservation of an open trading 
system  and  s·trict. compliance with the GATT  rules.  We  will not 
waver  in our determination to ensure that the rules of the game 
are applied without distinction b,y  one  and alle 
.. 
But  our differences with the United States are more  than purely 
commercial.  Of particular concern to me  are our divergent 
viel.;s  on lrorth-South relations  and  on the form  and  substance 
of future dialogue. 
American  economic  and monetar,y policy and its corollaries - a 
budget in deficit  and  high interest rates - are imposing enormous 
burdens  on the entire Western economy.  ·  The  countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance have now  reached  such  a  degree of economic 
interdependence that the  pr~servation and  development  of trade 
........................... 
.,· 7 
Third  World 
The  current deadlock in the North-south Dialogue makes  the 
consolidation and expansion of organized cooperation between the 
Ten  and the various groups of developing countries more  urgent 
than ever.  If the  Community  does not wish to lose the political 
credibility built up  on the strength of its development  record, 
it cannot  afford to  abandon its objectives for the North-south 
Dialogue,  as set out  in the report  endorsed by the 
European  Council  in June  last year;  it can act either on its 
own,  or in conjunction with its Western partners or in 
association with like-minded oil-producing countries,  but.act 
it must. 
The  Commission  would  Like  to 
organize  a  debate,' involving Parliame.nt  and  the  Council,  to 
formulate  the nucleus of its development  policy for the eighties. 
It "i-rill  present  the relevant  proposals by the  summer.  At  the 
same  time it will press on  resolutely with the  campaign to  combat 
hunger in the  world,  notably by means  of the plan of action 
adopted by the  Council  at its instigation in November. 
He  have talked of the tensions affecting relations with our 
major  ~!'estern trooing partners,  with the Eastern bloo  a.nd  with 
the developing world;  there is a  lesson to be  learned from 
all three.  And  it is this:  more  th~ ever before,  the  Community 
must  react with  a  single voice to  events  on the international 
scene,  and  adopt  a  single~ coherent  position,  to defend its 
legitimate interests and  affirm its political and cultural 
identity. 
.  ............................. . 
,-8 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from  my  analysis that the Commission  has a  special 
mission at this juncture:  to convince the Member  States and 
the general public that there is no  alternative to the Community, 
that it is the only effective remedy  for the ills that plague us. 
The  Community  has two  options:  it can admit  defeat in the face 
of centrifugal forces,  or it can fight on to attain a  higher 
level of integration and  developme~t. 
For the Commission  there is no  choice.  It cannot  contemplate 
surrender.  It will fight on. 
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STRASBOURG 1
Monsieur  le President, 
Mesdames  et Messieurs, 
La  coutume  parlementaire  veut  que  tous  les  ans,  meme  apres  le  discours  de 
legislature que  je vous ai presente au  debut de  l'annee derniere,  le President 
de  la Commission  expose  au  mois  de  fevrier  le programme-cadre  de  son institu-
tion.  En  faisant cela aujourd'hui je n'ai pas du  tout le sentiment de  sacrifier 
simplement a une  tradition.  La  Communaute  et le monde  qui l'entoure traversent 
des  temps  trop difficiles pour que  mon  expose  et le debat qui suivra puissent, 
surtout cette annee,  se reduire a un  exercice academique. 
La  Commission a arrete il y a  quinze  jours son programme-cadre  1982.  Le  document 
qui vous  a  ete remis trace les lignes principales de  l'action que  la Commission 
entend mener  au  cours  des  prochains mois.  Je n'y reviendrai pas,  ce serait une 
fastidieuse perte de  temps. 
Je voudrais aujourd'hui vous presenter l'analyse que  je fais du  contexte politi-
que  et economique et, a partir de  cette analyse,  vous  indiquer les grands choix 
et les grandes  priorites qui  me  paraissent  repondre  le mieux  aux  exigences de 
l'heure. 
La  Communaute  est menacee.  Au  dedans,  sa cohesion interne est compromise  par la 
crise economique.  Les  vieux demons  du  protectionnisme se reveillent et poussent 
a cultiver l'illusion qu'un repli sur soi apporte le salut. Au  dehors,  elle doit 
affronter des comportements agressifs de  la part de  ses partenaires commerciaux 
alors meme  qu!elle doit sauvegarder les chances de  ses secteurs traditionnels et 
parallelement  concou~ir a l'essor des  secteurs qui determineront a l'avenir la 
maitrise du  developpement  industrial. 
.  .. / ... 2. 
Ces  difficultes sont  ~randes et menaQantes.  Nous  les evoquons  souvent  sous  le 
vocable de  "revisions structurelles dechirantes" ou  de  changement necessaire de 
oivilisation.  Mais  je  me  refuse  a vous  proposer  un  discours  de  l'echec.  Les 
choix  politiques  que  je  vous  propose  peuvent  - non,  doivent  I  - fournir  les 
bases d'un sursaut qui ouvrira la voie a une relance de  la Communaute.  Celle-ci 
doit sortir des difficultes actuelles plus unie,  plus sure d'elle-meme et plus 
affirmee  sur  la  scene  mondiale.  Ce  sera  cela,  ou  le  declin  irreversible  des 
nations europeennes. 
Je  compte  sur  le  Parlement  europeen  pour  partager cette analyse et ces  choix 
politiques. 
.  ..  / ... L  E  CONTEXTE  ECONOMIQUE  E T  P 0  L I  T I  Q U E 
Au  plan  interieur,  la  situation  economique  reste  tres  difficile.  A certains 
egards,  elle s'est meme  notablement  aggravee  pendant  l'annee  1981.  En  disant 
cela,  je pense  d'abord  au  chomage  en  tant  que  phenomene  economique  et social 
sans  precedent  dans  la periode d'apres-guerre.  10.260.000  demandeurs  d'emploi 
recenses dans la Communaute a la fin de  l'annee derniere, soit plus de  9,2 %  de 
la population active,  done  un  accroissement de  28%  en un  an II! 
Les  perspectives de  croissance qui se dessinent a partir d'une prolongation des 
politiques economiques actuelles laissent prevoir une  augmentation constante du 
chomage.  Ainsi,  nous  risquons  de  repeter  1'  experience  vecue  ces  dernieres 
annees,  au  cours desquelles tout c'est passe comme  si, a peu de  chose pres,  nous 
avions transforme en  chomeurs  les nouveaux arrivants sur le marche  du  travail. 
Un  niveau de chomage  equivalent a celui que nous connaissons actuellement aurait 
ete considere, · au  debut  des  annees 70,  comme  superieur  au  seuil  de  tolerance 
sociale.  Nous  avons  sous-estime ce seuil. Mais  ceci ne  veut pas dire qu'il peut 
etre impunement  recule.  Nous  risquons un  jour de  devoir affronter des problemas 
graves  de  stabilite  sociale,  si  nous  n'y  prenons  garde  des  maintenant.  Le 
chomage  represente un  enorme  gaspillage  de  ressources et provoque  une  immense 
detresse  humaine.  En  fait,  son  cout  economique  est  en  s:os  equivalent a la 
facture petroliere, a laquelle nous  faisons souvent reference.  Son  cout social 
est incalculable. 
Notre  performance  en  matiere  d' investissements  n' est  pas  bonne  depuis  de 
nombreuses  annees,  c'  est  un  "euphemisme".  La  part  de  ressources  que  nous  y 
consacrons est en  baisse de  plusieurs points,  contrairement a ce que  realisent 
nos  principaux partenaires commerciaux, .les Etats-Unis et le Japon. 
Cette evolution est d'autant plus decevante qu'en fait,  c'est une  augmentation 
du  taur.  d' investissement qui aurai  t  ete  necessa:.~-,s,  compte  tenu de  nos  besoins 
de  restructuration industr•ielle et energetiqueo 
...  ! ... 4. 
La  carence des investissements est preoccupante a plus d'un titre. D'abord,  nous 
ne  creons  pas  les  postes  de  travail  necessaires  pour  donner  un  emploi a une 
population active encore  en  assez  forte  augmentation.  Ensuite,  nous  ralentis-
sons  le  flux  d' innovations  technologiques  qui  accompagne  1'  investissement  .. 
Enfin,  nous  compromettons  notre  competitivite  qui  sera de  plus  en  plus  condi-
tionnee  par  notre  capacite  de  produire  a  des  couts  competitifs  et  d'etre 
presel)ts dans les productions les plus avancees  du  point de  vue  technologique. 
La  persistance  de  la crise economique  soll.icite et renforce les  tentations de 
repli sur soi qui conduisent a  terme au  recloisonnement du  marche  interieur.  On 
observe  une  proliferation des  aides  nationales qui  brisent l'effort communau-
taire d'integration. La  Communaute  passe d'une "guerre du  vin" a  un  "conflit sur 
les dindes",  puis a  une  "querelle budgetaire".  La  restructuration necessaire de 
notre siderurgie est freinee,  parce  que  personne  ne  peut accepter d'accroitre 
des  pertes  d'emploi  dans  des  regions  deja  durement  frappees  par la Crise.  Je 
pourrais allonger encore la liste des  exemples~ Il nous faut absolument eloigner 
les menaces  qui pesent sur le marche  unique. 
Il s'agit d'un bien precieux et irremplaQable pour la Communaute,  qui a  ete une 
source  de  croissance,  d'emploi,  de  productivite,  de  bien-etre  depuis  sa 
creation.  Les  benefices  que  les  pays  peuvent  tirer  a  court  terme  d'une 
protection accrue de  leur marche  national sont peu de chose ~u regard des couts, 
certes plus diffus,  que  tout le monde  devra  supporter  a·  plus long  terme  d'une 
renationalisation des marches. 
La  Communaute  ne  survivrait  pas  a  la  destruction  du  marche  unique.  D'autres 
politiques perdraient alors leur raison d'etre,  telle la politique commerciale 
commune.  La  politique agricole  elle-meme,  qui  est fondee  sur le libre-echange 
interne et la preference  externe,  ne  resisterait pas  longtemps  comme  certains 
evenements  recents permettent de  le comprendre. 
• •• ! ••• 5. 
D'un autre  coter  nos  relations  avec  nos  partenaires americains et  japonais  se 
tendent continuellement du  fait des rigueurs de la crise. Un  contentieux commer-
cial  grave  est  en  train  de  se  creer,  qu'il  s'agisse  de  l'acier  ou  de 
!'agriculture  avec  les  Etats-Unis,  ou  du  desequilibre  de  nos  echanges 
commerciaux  avec le Japon.  Lorsque  les marches  se retrecissent,  la competition 
devient  plus  dure  et  elle  a  meme  tendance  a  deborder  les  aspects  purement 
commerciaux.  On  en  vient a mettre  en  cause  les conditions  dans  lesquelles les 
uns  et les autres garantissent la liberte effective des echanges et le respect 
des conditions de  concurrence. 
Ces  difficultes commerciales  ne  me  causeraient pas le meme  souci si des  diver-
gences entre les Etats-Unis et la Communaute  n'apparaissaient pas aussi sur des 
questions auasi importantes que les relations Nord-Sud et si la situation inter-
nationale ne s'etait pas profondement degradee.  Nous  semmes  temoins chaque  jour 
des  difficultes  que  rencontrent  les  democraties  pour  maintenir  le  minimum  de 
cohesion pol:i.tique sur des problemes exterieurs.  Allons-nous dans le meme  temps 
nous dechirer sur des dossiers eoonomiques,  oertes importants mais sans propor-
tion  avec  les  defts  politiques  auxquela  no~s  devons  faire  face  ?  C'est  le 
message  que  j'ai transmis  aux  Ministres  amerioains  lorsque  je les ai  reQUS  a 
Bruxelles en decembre  dernier,  et je crois qu'il a  ete compris. 
.  ..  / ... ! 
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L E  M A N D A T 
Le  rapport  de  la  Commission,  en  reponse  au  Mandat  que  le  Conseil  lui  avait 
confie  le 30  mai  1980,  s'est trouve  au  centre des  travaux  de  la Communaute  en 
1981  et depuis  le debut  de  oette annee. 
On  mesure  mieux aujourd'hui,  a  la lumiere des evenements,  que la Commission  ~ut 
bien inspiree en refusant des le debut. une interpretation purement budgetaire du 
Mandat  et  en  indiquant  que  la  seule  solution  possible  aux  difficultes  de  la 
Communaute  etait de  jeter  immediatement  les  bases  de  l'Europe  de  la  deuxieme 
generation~ 
La  Commission a  recommande  au Conseilr vous vous en souviendrezf  un programme  en 
trois volets de  relance europeenne et de  restauration de  la cohesion communau-
taire 
1.  Avant  tout~  relancer  1' integration  europeenne,  c' est-a-dire  donner  un 
nouvel  elan  a  la  solidari  te  economique  et  monetaire  et  developper  les 
politiques communautaires qui  permettront.de repondre  aux  defis des annees 
'80 1  celles en particulier de l'energie, de l'innovation1  de la recherche et 
du  developpement qui sont la condition d'un meilleur em~loi et d'une renova-
tion de  nos  industries. 
2.  Reformer  et  adapter  ce  qui  doit  l'etre dans  la  PAC,  dans  le  respect  des 
principes de  base de  cette politique. 
3.  Appor-ter  aux  problemes  budgetaires  les  correctifs  temporaires  qui 
pourraient s'averer necessaires pendant que le developpement des politiques 
communes  apportera une  solution plus durable a  ces problemes. 
• • • I • • • 7. 
La  necessite  de  la  relance  europeenne  s'imposait a nous  en  juin dernier quand 
nous  avons ecrit notre rapport.  Ce  qui s'est passe depuis la rend plus manifeste 
encore.  Je viens  de  vous  rappeler les difficultes auxquelles nous  devons  faire 
face.  Nous  ne  les resoudrons  pas par plus  de  nationalisme.  Le  message  de  votre 
Parlement 9  le message  de  notre Commission,  c'est que la reponse doit se  trouver 
dans plus de solidarite et dans plus d'integration. Telle etait et reste done la 
base politiqu.e de la position de la Commission,  qui a  inspire son rapport et ses 
propositions ulterieures. 
En  meme  temps que nous presentions cette perspective d'avenir,  nous cherchions a 
repondre a deux problemes qui deviennent de plus en plus preoccupants au fil des 
annees  :  1'  ajustement de  la politique ag:ricole  commune,  les difficultes budge-· 
taires du  Royaume-Uni. 
S'agissant de la reforme de la politigue agricole commune,  un certain nombre 
de verites premieres servent de  fondement a la position de la Commission.  Le 
bilan  de  20  ans  d'application  de  la  PAC  est positif.  Son  cout  global,  au 
regard  des  resultats atteints,  n'est  pas  excessif.  Aucun  pays  ne  peut  se 
passer d'une politique agricole et celle qui est appliquee par les princi-
paux  concurrents  de  la  Communaute  n'est  pas  moins  onereuse,  meme  si l'on 
additionne les depenses  communautalres et les depenses  nationales. 
En  raison  meme  du  succes  qu' a  rencontre  la  PAC,  et. des  progres  de  la 
producti  vi  te  agricole,  la  Commission  estime  souhai  table  d' apporter  des 
adaptations a cette politique,  en vue d'acquerir une meilleure maitrise des 
effets  du  fonctionnement  des  organisations  du  marche  (excedents  et impact 
budgetaire)  ;  elle  juge  possible  de  le  f'aire  dans  le strict  respect  des 
trois  principes  indissociables  qui  fondent  cette  politique  depuis  son 
origine. 
.  ..  / ... 8. 
La  mei lleure  maniE~re  d' assurer  la  sauvegarde  de  la  PAC  consiste  a  lui 
apporter  a  froid  et  a  temps,  c'est-a-dire  maintenant,  les  adaptations 
requises par son  succes meme. 
Mais  il faudra  le  fa ire  en  ayant  a  1' esprit  una  vision  claire  du  type 
d'agr.iculture auquel  l'Europe aspire.  L'effort de  modernisation necessaire 
pour la competitivite doit se poursuivre,  mais il doit etre concilie avec le 
souci  d'eviter  un  exode  rural  massif  inacceptable  dans  la  situation 
actuelle. C'est pour cela que la Commission a  voulu tenir compte du  problema 
des  revenus  des petits producteurs et des  regions a handicaps.  Le  maintien 
de  l'emploi  dans  l'agriculture repond aussi a  la vocation specifique  de  ce 
secteur  dans  la  Communaute  en  vue  d' assurer  a  travers  la  coexistence 
d  I expl0i  tatiOnS  de  Str'UCtUre  differente  Une  COntribUtiOn  a  1 t equilibre 
social,  regional et ecologique. 
Si l'on est d'accord sur des  options claires,  le reste est surtout affaire 
de  modalites  techniques  et  d'imagination.  En  revanche,  un  desaccord 
persistant signifierait qu'en  realite  on  n'est pas  d'accord  sur les choix 
fondamentaux. 
S'agissant des difficultes budgetaires du Royaume-Uni,  cet ecueil a  empeche 
peut-etre plus que tout autre la bonne fin des discussions sur le developpe-
ment  de  la Communaute. 
Il  nous  faut  etre  lucides  sur  les  raisons  de  1 'echec.  Il y  a  d' abord  la 
crise  qui  asseche  les  ressources  budgetaires  nationales  et  qui.  fait 
apparaitre,  selon un  raisonnement a c:our•te  vue~ les contributions au budget 
de la Comrnunaute  comme  un luxe reserve a des epcques mains austeres.  Il y  a 
ensuite  des  d:!.vergences  de  conception  quant  au  role  du  budget  de  la 
Communaute  qui  n' est  pas  un  mecanisme  de  perequation  visant a retablir a 
tout instant un  n juste retour~'' et dont la fonction ne peut etre ass:I.milee a 9. 
celle des  budgets  na tionaux  :  il suff'i  t  pour  s'  en  convaincre  de  comparer 
leur  importance  relative  ~  le  budget  de  la  Communaute  represente  0 1 8%  du 
produit  communautaire  ~  celui  des  Etats  membre:s  environ  50~( des  produits 
nationaux.  Il y  a  en  fin des posi  t:i..ons  differentes sur 1 ~ avenir a moyen  terme 
de  oe  budget.  La  Comro.ission  oonsidere  toujours  que  le  developpement.  des 
politiques  communautaires  ne  peut  etre  subordonne a une  limitation arbi-
traire des  ressources. 
Il nous  faut~ dans lvimmediat,  resoudre le probleme specifique britannique, 
sans pour cela admet tre un  droit quelconque au "juste retour'~ qui serai  t  la 
negation et la destruction de la solidarite entre les Etats membres.  Mais si 
le financement  de  la compensation  au  Royaume-Uni  doit etre assure  par  les 
ressources  propres,  la  dotation  budgetaire  qui.  sera  necessaire  epuisera 
quasiment  la marge  disponibleo 
La  Commission,  comme  le Parlement,  n'a jamais considere que  le destin de la 
Communaute  pouvai  t  etre contra  in  t  par le respect du  1% o  Nous  n'  en  tendons pas 
non  plus  freiner  le  developpement  de  nos  poli  tiques  stl~ucturelles  ou 
r·enoncer  au  finanoement  solidaire  de  la  politique  agricole  commune.  Ce 
serait se resigner a la stagnation de  la Communaute. 
Mais  franchir ce pas,  c'est-a-dire proposer de nouvelles ressources propres 
n'est pa.s  une  simple operation budgetaire. Il signifie que  nous  devons etre 
~ 
a meme  de proposer aux  Etats~ aux parlements nationaux, a l'opinion publique 
de  nos  pays le dessein et les projets qui  justifient ce transfert accru  de 
r•essources.  Pour emp<.1rter  oette adhesion,  nous devons pouvoir demontrer que 
l.a  Communaute  est une entreprise qui merite un elargissement de  sa capacite 
financiere.  C' est  ainst  que  pour  vous  comme  pour  nous  se  profile  una 
nouvelle  echeance  :  celle  de  la.  rencontre  de  nos  peuples  avec  un  projet 
oommunautaire oonvainoant.  C'est a  mes  yeux la tache prioritaire qu 9il nous 
faut accomplir pour le reste de  nos  mandats  respectifs. 
oOo ------·----------------------------------------------------------------
10. 
Beaucoup d'efforts et de  temps  ont ete consacres dans la Communaute,  a tous les 
niveaux, a la discussion des trois valets du  rapport de la Commission.  J'ai moi-
meme  tente, a la demande  des Ministres,  de degager une solution de  compromis  au 
debut.  de  janvier.  En  vain  ;  aucun  accord  d'  ensemble  n'  a  pu  etre  trouve  a ce 
jour. 
Il est  malaise  de  porter  un  jugement  serein  sur  cet  echec,  tant il est  pre-
occupant et irritant. 
Les  desaccorda  qui  persistent  peuvent  apparaitre  comme  limites  :  gestion  du 
seoteur  laitier1  rythme  d'evolution  des  depenses  agricoles,  modalites  des 
mesures  a  retenir  pour  le  Royaume-Uni.  J e  crains  qu' ils  n' aient  pu  etre 
surmontes parce qu'ils cachent mal  un  desengagement de nos gouvernements vis-a-
vis  de  1'  Europe~  ou  une  divergence  fondamentale  sur  la  structure  et  les 
finalites de  la  Co~unaute europeenne  • 
•  1e  ne  voudrais  pas,  en  disant  cela,.  mini.miser  la portae  des  accords  partiels 
auxquels les  discus~ions du  Conseil  europeen ont permis d'aboutir,  en particu-
lier s'agissant du  iancement de  nouvelles politiques communautaires dans diffe-
1 
rents secteurs  comm~ l 1industrie,  l 1energie,  la recherche et le developpement, 
ainsi que  de  1 'accrbissement des  moyens  d' emprunts/prets de la Com.IrxLmaute. 
Mon  objectif' immediat sera de tenter de convaincre lea gouv~rnement;s a aboutir a 
un  accor.>d  d' ensemble  dans  lea  plus  brefs  delais  et  au  plus  tard  au  Conseil 
eur.>opeen  de  fin  mara,,  A  cet.  eff'et?  les  nouvelles  discussions  que  le President 
Tindemans  et  mol  d~:WT'ons  avoir  dans  lea  sema:i.nes  qui  viennent  avec  nos  Etats 
membres  devront  \'i.OUS  permettre  de  verifier  la  pz~ofondeur de  1 1 accord  8U!'  les 
points  relatifs a la  relance  de  !'integration europeenne,  peut-~tre aussi  de 
degager  les  moyens  de  le  rendre  plus  eclatant  vis-a-vis  de  nos  opinions 
publiques.  Si  ce  fondement  pol:!.tique  ex:lste  bien,  je  suis  conva.incnl  que  nous 
pourr•ons  ensui  te  degager  d.es  comprom:L~  raisonnables  sur  les  p:roblemes  qui 
restent ouverts et qui  revetira:tent  alo:rs  une  nature  plus  techn:Lque  que  poli-
tlque.  Je  tiend:rai le Parlement  informe~ -------------------------------------
1 1 • 
Mais  si  - ce  qu' a Dieu  ne  pla:i.se  - nous  devions  finalement  cons  tater  une 
~ituation  de  blocage  et  d' impasse  au  :sein  du  Conseil,  alors  il  faudrait-
s'  interr•oger  sans  complaisance et  faux  :semblants  sur la volonte  poli  tique des 
Etats  membres  de  pourosuivre  la  constr-uction  europeenne  selon  1' inspiration 
initiale et sur la ca.pacite  decisiormelle  de  la Communaute  actuelle. 
Dans  un  tel cas,  co!lli;ne  nows  serions en face d 1u.ne  cri:se d' identite et d.u  devenir 
de  la  Communaute,  la  Commission  serait  amenee  a  prooeder  a  une  evaluation 
exhaustive  de la situation et des perspectives,  en ayant a l'esprit la gravite 
de  l'heure  et  les  responsabilites  particulieres  qui  lui  sont  confiees.  La 
Commission  ne  manquera  pas  d'associer  le  Parlement a oette evaluation et aux 
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de  noLbreuses  ann~~s,  la 
potentiel  economique.  Cela  se  tr~3.duit  pElr  une  UlOntee  du  r:!hom:;.,ge  '2&Ue  riel"  nf' 
sembl:>,  pouvoir  arreter.  Les  comport.ements  ::3n  matHn··e  d'  in'.r~s~:.is3eUJents  ~:~rt 
decwurages  parce  que  les  entreprisos  ne  voient;  ;'J.s  ~. 1 utn.i·(~e  r-Pajouter>  de 
nouvelles capacites a celles qui  ne  sont  de  que  parti;;,J.lE,ment  ut.tlisees, 
Les  espoirs  de  reprise  sont  regulierement  de9us.  On  escomptait  une  croissance 
moderee  en  1981 ,  c' est  a  un  leg.:::r  recul  que  1'  on  a  assiste.  Il y  a  quelques 
semaines  on esperait encore un taux de  2%  pour la aPcissance dd P.I.B.  en  1982. 
Il apparatt deja que  cette prevision pourrait itre revue  en baisse. 
Le  moment  est venu  de  nous  interroger sur  les politiques economiques  que  nous 
menons.  Il ne  s'agit pas  de  renoncer•  aux  efforts de  rigueur et de  maitrise que 
nous  avons  engages  notamment  pour  la  monnaie,  lea  finances  publiques  et  les 
r'evenus.  Ces  efforts  restent  neoessaires,  meme  si  on  a  le droit  de  se  sent.ir 
quelque  peu  decourages  par le sncces  t•-elatif auquel ils nous  ont conduits. 
Mais  parallelement a la poursuite  de  cet  effort.  dE;  rigueu~,  il est "\1ElCessaire 
d I entreprend!"e  Une  actiOn  ViSant  a Creer  deS  COnditiOnS  plUS  faVOt"'ableS  j)OU.J:" 
l  1 •:Jmploi  et  les  investissements.  Ma  reponse  est  resolument  affirmative.  Nous 
1 av-:::ms  pas le 
nement  au  tet•me  du  proceSSUS  d' a jus  tement.  actuell>3ment  en  C01.U'S  -. 
Si.  je  soullgne  1' :i.nvesti:ssement  et  l  0rnplol  c 1 est  parce  qu  1 U.s  representant 
l'objectif prioritaire et !'instrument  privilegi~ de  notre aotion  de  politique 
:Lex~  comrne  un  devcdr  de 
cent~e de  nos preoccupations pour  ne  pas laisser ~ux  f8.it  de 
tion AL  'ahaissement.  Nos  soc  t~s doivent 
a.u  sursaut. Nous  devons  construire nous-memes  notre avenir economique  sans attendre qu'une 
"main providentielle" nous  revele a nouveau le secret perdu de la croissance. La 
seulE~ strategle permettant de sortir de la crise est une strategie de combat.  Ce 
combat  nous  devons  le  mener  en  accordant  a  l'  investissement  une  prioz•i te 
absolue. 
Cette  idee  n'est d'ailleurs  pas  neuve.  Elle  inspirait  deja  l~avant-propos  du 
Verne  programme  de  politique economique a moyen  terme.  A partir de  ces orienta-
tions,  je  propose  done  de  mettre  en  oeuvre  une  action  au  plan  communautaire 
visant la relance de  l'investissement  fondee  sur des initiatives nationales et 
completee par une  contribution communautaire. 
Cette option de relance des investissements est d'abord valable pour les inves-
tissements  publics  au  sens  large.  Il nous  faut  combler  les retards en matiere 
d' :i.nfrastructures,  mais  il  nous  faut  surtout  developper  les  investissements 
dans  le domaine  de l'energie. 
Le  defi energetique sera le defi qui caracterisera les annees  1980.  La  reponse 
que  nous  lui  donnerons  conditionnera  lourdement  le succes  de  la bataille pour 
l'emploi. 
L' investissement  energetique  ameliore  les  perspectives  d' emploi  a un  double 
titre.  Comme  tout investissement, il contribue a relever le.niveau de  l'activi-
te.  En  outre,  il  allege  la  contrainte  que  fait  peser  sur  la  balance  des 
paiements la facture petroliere. Celle-ci s'est elevee en 1981  a 4%  du  P.I.B.  de 
la Communaute. 
Ce  chiffre indique  mieux  qu'aucun discours la marge  de manoeuvre qui nous  a  ete 
enlevee dans la poursuite  de  nos  objectifs  de  croissance et d'emploi.  Il nous 
faut  retrouver  cette  marge  de  croissance.  Les  pouvoirs  publics  ont  un  role 
determinant a jouer dans  la politique  de  l'investissement energetique,  notam-
ment  parce qu'ils assurent une grande partie des moyens  financiers. 
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Mais  l'investissement, c'est aussi et surtout l'affaire des  entreprises.  Leurs 
taux  de  rentabilite  ne  sont  pas  suffisants,  dans  la plupart  des  pays membres, 
pour  offrir  1'  incitation  necessaire.  Ces  marges  doivent  etre  restaurees  et 
ameliorees,  par la maitrise des  revenus  d'abord,  par un  amenagement  des dispo-
sitifs  fiscaux  ensuite.  Mais  il  faut  egalement  assurer  aux  entreprises  une 
previsibilite et une stabilite accrues du  cadre economique.  C'est une  condition 
essentielle pour que  leurs comportements et leurs anticipations deviennent plus 
positifs. 
Une  volonte  clairement affirmee  par  les  pouvoirs  publics  d'engager  une  action 
visant a maitriser la crise et a assurer la stabilite monetaire est decisive a 
cet  egard.  C' est  dans  cet  esprit  aussi  qu' il faut  apprecier  les  prochaines 
propositions  de  la  Commission  concernant  la  consolidation  du  S.MoE.  sur 
laquelle  je reviendrai. 
Les  taux d'interet jouent un  role important  dans la decision d'investissement. 
La  poussee  observee  ces  derniers  mois  trouve  ses  origines  dans  des  facteurs 
externes,  en  particulier1  la  politique  monetaire  des  Etats-Unis.  C'est 
seulement  a travers  une  concertation  comnrunautaire  interne  et  une  attitude 
commune  a l'egard  de  ce  pays  que  l'on peut esperer attenuer lteffet· dissuasif 
des  taux d'interet actuellement observes. 
QueUes contributions  la.  Comrm.maute  peut-elle apporter a la relance  des  inves-
tis.sements  '?  Cen·•tes,  les moyena  pr•inoipaux,  les decisions principales1  restent 
dans  les  mains  des  Gouvernements.  Le  role  de  la  Communaute  •est  de  donner 
1
1 impulsion  necessaire  et  surtout  d 1 organiser  la  convergence  des  actions 
nationales.  Elle  fmtrn1t  le  cadre  dans  lequel  pour>ra  etr'e  mis  a.u  polnt  un 
ensemble  coherent de  mesures qui  per>mettra d'arriyer a une  effioacite et: a une 
complementarite  optimales. et  d,e  moyens  financiers  plus 
d~velopp~a au cours des 
,  tre~ mod~mte! 1  il est  vra1~ 
•  Ces  derniers  se  sent  r~guli~rement 
annees  et. ils ont ete  de  plus  en plus  conoen-, 
tres  sur  1 1 energie"  Cette  tendance  doit  se  pour"suivre  pour  que  la Communa.ute 
sol  t  a meme  d  1 acconipagner' les efforts que les pays auront decide  d  ~ entl"'eprendr'e. 
A  cet  egar'd~  le developpement  du  nouve.l  instl:'ument.  aommunautalre prend toute sa 
signification. 
La  Communaute  peut  encore  contr::l.buer  a 1a  relance  de  1 w investissement  et  du 
developpement  industrial  en  definissant  les  elements  dwune  strat~gie 
industrielle.  Celle~ci  doi  t  d.' a.bord  etr>e  fondee  sur  1'  approfondissement  du 
ma.l"Che  interieur qu' il s 1 a.git  d  ~ abor·'d  de  sauvegarder  des  attaques  dont il est 
l'objet~ ensuite dvapprofondir  pOUl"'  QU 1il Offre la dimension indispensable a la 
creation  diune  base  industrielle  moder'ne.  Pour  la  strategie  industrielle,  je 
vous  renvoie  au  document  que  la  Comm:Lssion  a  pr.esente  en  octobre  dernier. 
L  ~ objectif est de  creer un  verit.able espace  industriel europeen,  fonde  sur une 
reel)e preference com.munautaire derivant de 1'  approfondissement du marche inte-
rieur,  sur la creation du cadre juridique necessaire a la constitution d'entre-
prises  eu1·opeennes1  sur  le  renforcement  des  incitations  a la  recherche,  au 
developpement et a 1 1innovation et enfin  sur  une  action audacieuse  en  matiere 
d'achats publics brisant progressivement les monopoles  nationaux. 
L' investissement est cre~teur d 7 emplois ou il indui  t  la creation d' e'mplois  dans 
d'autres secteurs.  Cependant?  face a 1a rnontee  du  chomage,  nous  ne  pouvons  pas 
simplement  attendre  les  consequences  a moyen  ou  long  terrpe  du  developpement 
economique.  Nous  devons  rechercher'  inlassablernent  les  moyens  de  susciter  la 
demande d'emplof,  de faciliter l'embauche,  de supprimer les goulots d'etrangle-
ment administratifs,  legislatifs,  coutumiers.  La  aussi,  l'essetitiel du  travail 
se fait dans les Etats ou dans les regions.  La  Communaute  a  egalement  un  role  a, 
jouer  et  r',ous  entendons  mieux  le  definir•  a<l  cours  des  prochains  mois  dans  la 
ligne esquissee dans le Ra.pport,  sur le Mandat et les communications ulterieureso 
Il  s vagi  t  d 
1 abord  de  de  gager  des  lignes  d i actions  communes,  par  exemple  en 
matiere  de  r·ormation professionnelle et d' a,menagement  du  temps  de  travail,  qui 
soutiendront les initiatives de chacun de nos pays en evitant les distorsions de 
concurrence. 16. 
Il s'agit ensuite  de  revoir  les  r~gles et  lam  conditions  de  fonctionnement  de 
n~>:J  graz1d.s  F'onds  struoturels  pour  mieux  les  adapter  aux  besoins  du  tempB 
present. C'est le sens de la reforme du  Fonds regional qui est deja devant vous. 
Ce  sera aussi le sens de la revision du  Fonds social european que  nous  comptons 
vous  soumettre  dans  les  toutes  prochaines  semaines.  Ces  deux  instruments  ne 
seront  pas  simplement  un  complement  de  ce  qui  est fait  dans  chaque  pays.  Nous 
entendons qu'ils creent des  incitations pour  un  meilleur developpement et pour 
un  meilleur emploi. 
Il  s'  agi  t  enfin  de  mettre  en  oeuvre  ensemble  des  actions  specifiques  pour 
l'emploi, telle que cella que la Commission  a  deja proposee et qui vise a  offrir 
aux  jeunes  de  16  a 18  ans  une  possibilite alternative au  chomage  sous  forme  de 
formation  professionnelle,  de  perfectionnement  scolaire  et  d'experiences  con-
cretes de  travail. 
Tels  sont  les axes  principaux  de  la bataille  pour  l'emploi et les investisse-
;r.ents.  La  Communaute  se trouve devant une necessite de  changement presque aussi 
forte qu'apres la deux:;.eme  guerre mondiale.  Il y  vade sa capacite de maintenir 
son  rang  au  sein  des  nations  industrialisees,  de  transformer  la  resignation 
diffuse qui prevaut actuellement  en une  ardeur  de  conquete qu'elle proposerait 
aux  jeunes~ de retrouver enfin la voie de son developpement a partir d'objectifs 
a poursuivre  en  co~~un. 
J'aj_  evoque  tout .a  l'heure  la  consolidation  du  S.M.E.  qui  revet  une  grande 
signification pour trois raisons  : 
- l'  evolution  recente  des  relations  monetaires  internationales  a  nettement 
accru l'instabilite des  taux  de  change  et des  taux d'interet  ;  la Communaute 
' 
~oit affirmer sa volonte  de  reduire ces  incertitudes  ; 
- le bon  fonctionnement  du  S.M.E.  depuis sa creation rend credible le renforce-
X0nt  du  systeme  ; 
- les conditions d'un developpement institutionnel ulterieur du  systeme  seront 
~  ,  , , 
alrlSl crees. 
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L'exercice  que  la  Communaute  doit  mener  revet  deux  dimensions.  Une  dimension 
interne d'abord.  Le  renforoement  du  s.M.E.  doit  pas~•~  c 
par une  plus grande coherence interne du  systeme  (amenagement  du  processus 
de  creation  d'Ecus,  consolidation  des  mecanismes  en  place  par  le 
developpement 
communautaires) 
des  interventions  intra-marginales 
par la promotion de  l'utilisation de  l'Ecu 
en  monnaies 
par des  progres  tangibles  dans  la convergence  des  performances economiques 
(car tout renforcement du  systeme est voue a l'echec, si la pratique et les 
resultats  de  la  coordination  des  politiques  ne  sont  pas  sensiblement 
ameliores). 
Mais  le  developpement  du  S.M.E.  doit  revetir egalement  une  dimension  externe, 
particulierement critique dans  l'environnement actuel  :  la mise  en  oeuvre pro-
gressive  d'une  cooperation  mom1taire  effective  et  orga:qisee  en  premier  lieli 
'  avec les USA  conditionnera tres etroitement le succes du  S.M.E.  dans la periode 
i  ' 
qui s'ouvre.  La·Commission n'a cesse,  depuis de  nombreux mgis,  de souligner aveq 
~. 
vigueur l'urgence de discuter des amenagements a apporter  ~ux relations avec le 
" 
$  :  aujourd'hui cette discussion s'impose  avec  une acuite accrue. 
Pour  la Commission,  la reaffirmation  de  l'identite monetaire  europeenne,  dont 
il ne faut pas nier les reelles difficultes,  a  une double valeur de symbole,  car 
elle  touche a la fois a la solidarite et a la  discipline  exercees  en  commun. 
C'est dire qu'elle constitue  pour  nous  un  test de  capacite a decider ensemble 
de  cohesion politique. 
C  · '"' ""·.:.  dans  cet esprit et selon ces  lignes  que  la Commission  fer  a  les proposi-
~~o~s necessaires. 18. 
LES  RELATIONS  EXTERIEURES  DE  LA  COMMUNAUTE 
Le  Chapitre  de  nos  relations  s·xterieures  revet  une  importance  particuliE~re 
cette annee en raison des t.ensio••s grandissantes dont elles sont 1'  objet du fait 
de  la propagation de  la arise economique  dans  le monde  et de  la deterioration 
des rapports Est-Ouest. 
La  credibilite  de  notre  politique  exterieure  est  fonction  de  not:re  realite 
interieure?  de  notre  cohesionv  de  notre  capacite  de  traiter  les  affaires  de 
man:l'.er·e  coherente  au  nom  de  toute la Communautec  Nous  dev-ons  etre penetres  de 
cette verite premiere  g  notre politique de  r·elations exterieures est affaiblie 
des  lors qu v un doute existe chez notre interlocutetu" que la Comm1.maute  n 
1 est pas 
1.m:i.e  sur  une  position  commune  et  ooherente.  c~ est  la  r"aison  principale  pour 
laquelle la ca.pacite de  negociation de  la Commission peut  s~apprecier differem-
ment  selon les pays  ou  selon les secteu:rs.  Si d.es  Etats membr'es  meme:nt  a titre 
individual  des  negociations  avec  un  partenaire  pa:rall~lement aux  negociations 
que  meme  la  Commiss:ton 9  la  Communaute  est  automatiquement  hand.icapee  dan.s  sa 
force  de  negociation.  De  meme,  la Commission  a  plus  de  poids  dans  les discus-
sions  internationales  relatives  a  l~acier  ou  aux  produits  agricoles  que 
lorsqu'elle aborde les questions monetaires  ou  meme  energetiques. 
Cette remarque generale  s~applique tout particulierement au~ relations que nous 
entretenons avec le Japon qui fait preuve au niveau mondial d'une competitivite 
exceptionnelle dans  plusieurs secteurs industrials. 
Si  le  Japon  et  la  Communaute  doivent  egalement  respecter  les  disciplines 
intern.ationalement  acceptees,  la  Communaute  s'  in.quiete  legitimement  du 
developpement  desequilibre de  ses rapports avec le Japon et de l'aggravation de 
son  deficit  commercial~  Pour  etre  a . la  hauteur  de  ses  responsabilites 
internationales,  le Japon  doit apporter  sa contribution au  bon·  ~onotionnement 
de notre systeme 
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economique,  et, par consequent,  en accepter les contraintes en meme  temps qu'il 
en retire des avantages.  A ce titre, il doit ouvrir son marche  interieur. Il ne 
s'  agit  pas  seulement  d 'accro!.tre  nos  exportations  de  marchandises.  Il  faut 
egalement nous  donner la possibilite de  participer aux activites economiques  du 
Japon,  notamrnent  dans le secteur des banques et des services ou  nos entreprises 
n'ont pas les memes  possibilites d'acces que  celles que  trouvent  chez  nous  les 
Japonais. En  outre, le Japon doit comprendre la necessite de  moderer volontaire-
ment  11 impact  de  certaines  exportations,  car  il  a  interet  a  ce  que  nous 
reussissions  nos  ajustements  economiques.  C'est le sens  de  la negociation  que 
nous  avons  entreprise. 
Le  gouvernement  japonais vient  d'annoncer certaines  mesures  de  liberalisation 
de  son marche.  La  Commission,  tout en les considerant comme  un pas dans la bonne 
direction,  pense,  helas,  que  d'importants obstacles aux importations persistent 
au  Japon.  Elle  estime,  par  consequent,  qu'une  nouvelle  initiative  doit  etre 
prise.  A cet  effet,  nous  avons  propose  au  Conseil  que  la discussion  avec  les 
autorites japonaises soit poursuivie activement dans le cadre du  GATT,  sur base 
des droits que  nous  donne l'article 23. Seule la Communaute  en tant que telle -
le cas echeant en liaison avec d'autres membres  du  GATT  - peut pretendre a  des 
resultats significatifs. 
A terme,  la  reponse  au  defi  japonais dependra  evidemment  de  notre capacite de 
doter  la  Communaute  d'  une  strategie  industrielle  qui  favQrisera  1'  emergence 
d'entreprises europeennes performantes dans les secteurs industrials de demain. 
Je vous l'ai deja dit tout a  l'heure. 
Le  developpement  de  nos relations economigues  avec  les pays  de  l'Est a  ete mis 
en  cause  par  le  drame  polonais  et  la  tension  Est-Ouest  qui  ont  brusquement 
revele les incompatibilites de  deux modeles politiques profondement differents, 
et les ambiguites  que  cette situation entraine dans  notre  demarche  economique 
vis-a-vis de  ces pays.  Un  choix difficile est done  devant  nous. · 
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:p  est clair qu' il  ne,  peut  y  avoit•  de  "business as usua!?'  apres les evenements 
du  13  decembre  de  l'~nnee derniere en Pologne. 
% 
Nous  deplorons  1'  opP,ression  bl"Ut.ale  des  aspirations  du  peuple  polonaiso  La 
Communaute  doit participer a Ieerfort qui doit etre entrepris pour qu'il y soit 
mis  fin. 
Nous  avions  note  avfc  satisfaction  l'  intensification  des  echa.nges  de  toute 
nature  entre  .PEst  ~t  l'Ouest  qu:t  s'etai.t  produite  au  oours  des  dernieres 
annees~  nonobstant f  les  differences  de  systemes  politico-economiqueso 
Aujourd'hui,  les  pro~res vers une certaine normalisation des rapports entre la 
C?mmunaute  eur·opeenn+  et l  ~Europe orientale sont compromis" 
' 
Tfnt que  durent la loi martia.le et la  repression  en  Pologne,  imposees  sous  la 
pression sovietique,  nos  rapports resteront gravement hypotheques" 
Nos  p;"eoooupations  s 1 adressen.t  egalement,  et.  peut-e·Gre  surtout,  aux  relations 
entre  l'Europe  et  les Etats-Unis  que  tant  de  liens unissent.  Ce  se  passe 
entre  lea  Etat;s-Un:.ts  et  .l'EurO}:·f:l  pourrait  aller'  bien  au-dela  <Fun  oo;.;.tl:it 
ocmmercial  exace':"'be  par. la  crLse: et  les  difficult.ea  internes,  Tout  ?3B  passe 
comme  al 1 fEurope  ;:.;t  les Etats·-Un:l.s  se mettaient a douter  fondamenta.lement  1 "v.n 
de  11 autre et,  par' voie de con.sequ.ence 1  s' interrogaaient en profondeur sur leur 
fiabilite respective. 
A  l'origine  de  ce  sentiment  se  trouve  de  part et d'autre  une  interpretation 
negative  de  comportements  divergeant  a  differentes  occasionsr  au  cours  des 
dernieres  annees,  par  exemple~  a l'occasion  de  crises  politiques  qui  se  sont 
produites dans differentes parties du  monde.  Cette orientation nouvelle  trouve 
egalement ses racines dans les tPansforma.tions qui se sont operees au seln de la 
Societe americaine  et europeenne  depuis  la fin  de  la derniere guerre  mondiale 
avec,  entre  autres,  la  montee  des  nouvelles  generations  et  !"evolution  des 
courants d'idees. 21. 
Dans  un  tel  climat,  les  conflits  commerciaux  concernant  l'acier  et  l'agri-
culture,  meme  s'ils ne  sont pas  nouveaux,  prennent une  dimension additionnelle 
et  deviennent  plus  difficiles  a traiter  sur  leurs  merites  propres.  Ils  se 
presentent ainsi comme  des elements de  rupture possible du  pacte commercial et 
economique  qui  nous  lie depuis tres longtemps aux Etats-Unis. 
Je suis convaincu et j'espere que la profonde communaute  de valeurs, d'interets 
strategiques et meme  de destin qui nous unit permettra,  moyennant  un  dialogue de 
substance,  le maintien d'une alliance forte et equilibree. 
Il reste  que  l'Europe  et  l'Amerique  peuvent  etre  redoutablement  concurrentes 
l'une de  l'autre et que  la concurrence  economique  peut quelquefois  se muer  en 
conflit.  Nous  nous  sommes  fixes  avec  les  Etats-Unis  une  ligne  claire  :  le 
maintien d'un systeme commercial ouvert et le strict respect des regles du  GATT. 
Nous  veillerons avec determination a ce que les regles de ce  jeu s'appliquent a 
tous  sans discrimination. 
Mais  nos  divergences  avec  les  Etats-Unis  depassent  le  domaine  strictement 
commercial.  Je  suis fort  preocoupe  par celle qui  concerne  les relations Nord-
Sud,  qu'il s'agisse de  la forme  que pourrait revetir le dialogue entre les pays 
du  Nord  et du  Sud  ou qu'il s'agisse des  problemas  de  fond. 
En  matiere economique et monetaire, la politique americaine ~t ses corollaires -
deficit budgetaire et hausse  des  taux  d'interets - font  peser des  contraintes 
enormes  sur  1'  ensemble  des  economies  occidentales.  Les  pays  de  1'  Alliance 
atlantique  ont  atteint  un  tel  degre  d'interdependance  economique  les  uns  par 
rapport aux autres qu'il ne saurait etre possible de maintenir et de developper 
leurs  echanges  sans  une  coordination  plus  poussee  de  leurs  politiques 
economiques.  L'alternative  ne  pourrait  etre  qu•un  antagonisme  economique 
croissant qui se traduirait vite par des  tensions au plan  politique~ ~~ -----------------------------------
22. 
~i ella cree ou  amplifie  les tensions dans les relations de  la Communaute  avec 
~, 
~'Est ou  avec  l'Ouest,  la crise economique  pese surtout  d'un  poids enorme  sur 
res pays  en developpement. 
L'impasse  dans  laquelle se  tr-ouve  le dialogue Nord-Sud  appelle plus que  jamais 
le  renf'orcement  et  J.e  developpement  des  relations  de  cooperation  organisee 
qu'entretiennent la Comrounaute  et ses Etats membres  avec  differents groupes  de 
pays en developpement.  Sauf a perdre le credit politique que lui vaut son action 
passee  en  mati.ere  de  developpement,  la  Communaute  ne  saurait  reno:ncer  a 
poursuivre  le~ objectifs qu'elle sretait fixes pour le dialogue Nord-Sud et qui 
sont  conslgnes  dans  le  rapport  approuve  en  juin  1981  par le Conseil  europeen1 
qpe ce soit de man:tere  autonome  ou  en conjonction avec les pays  OC(ddentaux,  ou 
l~s pays  petl."'oliers  8.  excedent qui partagent lea memes  vues. 
Xiix  ans  apres  le  Sopmet  de  Paris,  qui  a  pose  les  bases  de  sa  politique  de 
~leveloppement.  ~  l'  anrfe  1982  fom•nU:,  a la Comrnunaute  1'  occasion  d 
7 une  nouvelle 
" ,. ""'1  1  ~  •  ~  r~'  ·~ · t'  1·  ·  t  t ·  "  ~  h ·  '  ,  ..  1  d  r-j6.t  ex  on  sur  J.e.s  .~"la  ....  ~L  es7  ~·o:rJ.en  a  :101:1  geograp  l.que  ec  ... es  ins•.,rumen~s  ~e 
>  J 
~ette pol:ttique.  La  bornm:l.ss1on  souhaite~ avant que  soit entamee  la  pr~eparatlon 
.,]:  ., 
~h"  r·en'louvell.;:;roe:nt  ~e  la.  Cor.nrent:l.on  de  Lorna  II~  qu~un  debat  int.er"vienrH~ 9 
~ssoeiant Pa;:'lement let  C:onseil~  ooul."  determiner les grands axE.;s  de la poli  tique 
,L  :'  .. 
qu' elle  ~~ntend mene;i>  a 1! ega:rd  des  pays  en  develc)ppemerrt  dans  les annees 
7 80 0 
Elle  fer'a  vers  le  m5"1ieu  de  1. 'annee  les  pr·opositions  necessa.i:re,s  a cet egard" 
Parallelement,  Com<•nissio;:J  pour>auivra  resolument  engagee  pour 
combat.tre  la  fa.im  dans  le  monde,  notamment  par  la  mise  en  oeuvre  du  plan 
d'action adopte  sur sa proposition par le Conseil en novembre  1981"~ 
Qu' .il  s'  agisse  de  tensions  avec  ses  principaux  partenaires  ocoidentaux  ~  des 
tensions  plus  fondamentales  encore  avec  les  pays  de  1'  Est  ou,  enfin,  des 
tensions et des frustrations dans ses relations avec les pays en developpement, 
la Communaute  doit en tirer une  leQon  commune  pour son comportement  futur  g  il 
est plus  necessaire  que  jamais  que  dans  les grands  eve~ements internationaux, 
elle fasse entendre une~voix unique,  exprimant une position unique et coherente, 
non  seulement  en  vue  de  la defense  de  ses  int;.erets  legitimes,  mais aussi pour 
affirmer son identite politique et culturelle. 23. 
~ES  P  R 0  B L E M E S  I  N S T I  T U T I  0  N N E L S 
Avant  de  conclure,  je  voudrais  enfin  parler  des  2roblemes  institutionnels 
auxquels  1'  Europe  se  trouve  aujourd' hui  confrontee  :  certains  sont  d' une 
actualite  immediate  ~t urgentep  d'autres concernant plutot le developpement a 
long  terme  de  la commvnaute. 
Dans  mon  discours-programme  il y  a  douze  mois  j'ai deja  souligne !'importance 
' 
capitale de  retablir ~a Eaix  entre les Insti.tutions  communautaires.  Bien  sur, 
; 
c' est  dans  la  naturt;~  meme  de  la  construction  europeenne  qu' il  existe  une 
} 
rivalite,  voire  une  l~tte d'influence entre Parlement,  Conseil  et  Commission. 
I 
Mais  les  Institutio~s  doivent  cooperer  d'une  faQon  telle  qu'un  resultat 
constructif reste posfible.  Cela n'a pas  toujours ete le cas,  et notamment  pas 
dans  la procedure budJetaire  ~ pour  ne citer qu'un seul exempleo  La  Commission 
se felicite de  ce que1la classification des  depenses  fasse enfin l'objet d'une 
concertation  interins~itutionnelle et elle est decidee a y  jouer pleinement son 
role.  Nous  souhaitonsidonc une  solution politique qui permette de  renoncer aux 
recours devant la Cour  de Justice et ouvre enfin la perspective d'une procedure 
b~dgetaire selon des regles incontestees. 
Au-dela  de cette querelle budgetaire peu  comprehensible  pou~l'opinion publique 
de nos pays, quels sont les vrais problemes ?  Tous  ceux qui se tiennent informes 
le clament  chaque  jour  :  ce sont le pouvoir trop faible attribue a  ce Parlement 
et l'incapacite decisionnelle du  Conseil. 
Renforcer le role du  Parlement.  Sans ignorer d'autres possibilites, developpees 
dans  les textes que  vous  avez  adoptes  en  juillet dernier,  le  moyen  dont  nous 
disposons  aujourd' hui  ~  c' est  d' ameliorer  et  de  renforcer  la  procedure  de 
concertation.  Nous  vous  avons  saisi~  comme  le  Conseil,  d 'une  proposition  en 
decembre  dernier.  Nous  soutiendrons  ces  efforts,  Monsieur  le President,  pour 
que,  des  ce  semestre,  les  Presidents  des  trois Institutions  ;:,  saisissent  du 
dossier et le fassent aboutir, 24. 
Met tre  fin  a  1' incapaci  te  du  Conseil  de  prendre  des  decisions  est  d' une 
importance fondamentale  pour la Communaute.  Seul un  nouvel engagement politique 
de  nos  gouvernements,  de  nos  peuples pour l'Europe integree permettra vraiment 
de  surmonter  cet  obstacle  central.  Mais  le  respect  des  regles  du  Traite  - je 
veux  dire du  vote majoritaire,  stipule pour tant de  matieres- Y,contribuerait 
puissamment,  dans la pratique quotidienne.  Le  recours  de  plus en plus large au 
vote majoritaire est a nouveau d'actualite.  Le  President Tindemans  a  clairement 
dit  ses  intentions a ce  sujet.  La  Commission  sera  a  ses  cotes  et fera,  elle 
aussi,  tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour mettre les Membres  du  Conseil devant 
leurs responsabilites. 
Lorsque  nous  nous  attaquons  a nos  problemes  immediats,  nous  devons  toujours 
avoir presente a l'esprit la vision de  nos  objectifs a long  terme. 
Monsieur le President?  les vues  de  la Commission  sur l'Union europeenne et son 
engagement a l'egard de  ce concept sont bien connus et je ne les repeterai pas 
ici.  Nous  nous  semmes  felicites de  la recente initiative de  Messieurs Genscher 
et Colombo  dont bon  nombre  de  priorites sont celles que j'ai deja enumerees.  La 
Commission  jouera le role  qui  lui  incombe  lorsqu'elle  examinera  les  proposi-
tions de  Messieurs Genscher et Colombo  et se laissera guider par les considera-
tions suivantes  : 
Il  faut  preserver  et  developper  1'  acquis  communautaire.  Lorsque  nous  deve-
loppons  de  nouvelles  possibilites  de  cooperation,  comme,  par  exemple, 
!'extension  des  activites  de  cooperation  intergouvernementale,  telle qu'elle 
est proposee dans  le projet  d'Acte,  nous  devons  nous  assurer que  le processus 
d'integration est sauvegarde  et renforce.  L'unification basee  sur les Traites 
est et doit rester le centre de gravite  de  la construction europeenne. 
Certes,  la Commission  soutiendra le  developpement  de  la cooperation politique 
afin qu'elle s'etende a des domaines qui jusqu'a present n'etaient pas couverts, 
comme,  par  exemple,  les questions  de  securite~ Toutefois,  il ne  faudrait pas, 
selon  elle~  que  ceci  puisse  ou  doive  se  substituer a la poursuite  du  develop-
pement  des  politiques  communes  ou  servlr>  d  t alibi a P  incapa.cite  de  s'  attaquer 
aux difficultes politiques. 25. 
Encore  un  mot  sur la  Commission  institutionnelle que  votre  Parlement vient  de 
creer.  Nous  nous  felicitons  de  cette  initiative et  nous  semmes  conscients  de 
l'enorme difficulte de la tache. Si cela est souhaite,  la Commission est prate a 
s'engager avec  vous  dans  cette voie.  Nous  vous  offrons  toute aide pratique et 
technique ainsi qu'une pleine participation a la reflexion politique. 
oOo 
Avant  de  conclure,  je  voudrais  eviter  de  donner  1' impressi?n ·que  seuls  les 
grands themes que j'ai traites dans mon  expose revetent de !'importance aux yeux 
de  la Commission. 
L'activite  s'etendra a !'ensemble  des  questions  presentees  dans  le  programme-
cadre et je m'en  voudrais  de  vous  laisser  sur  !'impression  que  des  questions 
aussi  importantes  que  la  peche  et  l'elargissement,  pour  ne  citer  qu'elles, 
pourraient  passer a l'arriere-plan.  Sur  ces  deux  dossiers  en  particulier,  un 
effort  considerable  sera  fait  pour  que  des  progres  decisifs  scient  accomplis 
avant la fin de  1982. 
oOo 
•• • I ••• 26. 
C 0  N C L U S  I  0  N S 
L'analyse  que  je  vous  ai  proposee  dicte  la  responsabilite  particuliere de  la 
Commission  dans les circonstances actuelles. 
Il  s'agit  pour  elle  d'emporter  l'adhesion  des  Etats  membres  et  de  l'opinion 
publique sur l'idee qu'il n'y a  pas d'alternative a la Communaute,  parae qu'elle 
est la seule reponse credible aux maux  qui tenaillent nos societas. Le  choix est 
simple. D'un cote, il y ala resignation devant l'action des  ~orces centri~ges. 
De  l'autre, il y  a  le sursaut qui conduira la Communaute  a un niveau plus eleve 
d'integration et de  developpement. 
L' engagement  que  la  Commission  prend  est  de  rendre  ce  sursaut  possible  en 
re~sant la paralysie de  l'entreprise qu'elle a  la tache de  mener. 